The Collision Between the Rights of Women, the Rights of the Fetus and the Rights of the State: A Critical Analysis of the Criminal Prosecution of Drug Addicted Pregnant Women by Reitman, Deanna Rae
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 16 
Issue 1 Volume 16, Winter 2002, Issue 1 Article 6 
January 2002 
The Collision Between the Rights of Women, the Rights of the 
Fetus and the Rights of the State: A Critical Analysis of the 
Criminal Prosecution of Drug Addicted Pregnant Women 
Deanna Rae Reitman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Reitman, Deanna Rae (2002) "The Collision Between the Rights of Women, the Rights of the Fetus and the 
Rights of the State: A Critical Analysis of the Criminal Prosecution of Drug Addicted Pregnant Women," 
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 16 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol16/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE COLLISION BETWEEN THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN, THE RIGHTS OF THE FETUS AND
THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
OF DRUG ADDICTED PREGNANT WOMEN
DEANNA RAE REITMAN*
INTRODUCTION
An estimated 375,000 infants are born each year affected by
maternal drug abuse during pregnancy, requiring up to $100,000
of intensive medical care per child.1 A $37.5 million price tag has
compelled courts and legislatures to take action, many imposing
criminal sanctions against pregnant drug users.2
The use of criminal sanctions to deal with pregnant drug users
has been controversial, 3 raising constitutional questions, both
"Class of 2002, St. John's University School of Law.
I See Patricia A. Sexton, Imposing Criminal Sanctions on Pregnant Drug Users:
Throwing the Baby out with the Bath Water, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 410, 410 (1993) (citing
Suzann Silverman, Scope, Specifics of Maternal Drug Use, Effects on Fetus Are
Beginning to Emerge from Studies, 261 JAMA 1688 (1989). The most frequently cited
national estimate of the number of drug-exposed newborns is 375,000. The estimated
number is from a 1988 survey of 36 hospitals conducted by the National Association of
Perinatal Addiction, Research and Education. The hospitals surveyed are located in
"heavily populated areas." The statistics include newborns who have been exposed to
.crack, heroin, methadone, cocaine, amphetamines, PCP and marijuana." Id, see also
Douglas J. Besharov, Crack Children in Foster Care, 19 CHILDREN TODAY, 21, 22 (1990).
The article stated that in 1988, 25 out of every 1,000 children in the United States died
before their fifth birthday due to drug exposure while in the uterus citing MICHAEL
KIDRON ET AL., THE NEW STATE OF THE WORLD 55 (1991) The United States infant
mortality rate is equal to less affluent countries such as Costa Rica and Honduras.
2 See Sexton, supra note 1, at 411; Louise Marlane Chan, S.O.S. from the Womb: A
Call for New York Legislation Criminmaizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 199, 199-203 (1993); Fern Schumer Chapman, We'll Pay Now or We'll Pay
Later, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 1990, at 6.
3 See Sexton, supra note 1, at 411 (discussing "sharp" philosophical disagreements
that exist with regards to how to treat drug abusive pregnant woman:
Woman's rights advocates assert the most effective approach is to enable women to
receive prenatal care without the threat of criminal prosecution. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) argues that prosecution of pregnant women will not only fail to
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facial and consequential, and questions regarding autonomy in
the fetal-maternal conflict. 4 Part I of this analysis will discuss
the constitutional issues and the issues of autonomy raised by
the criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women. The
discussion is divided into three sub-sections: (1) the rights of
women; (2) the rights of the fetus; and (3) the rights of the state.
Part II discusses the collision between the rights of women, the
fetus and the state. The analysis will discuss the subordination
caused to women by the criminal prosecution of pregnant drug
users, based solely on a woman's biological ability to become
pregnant. Part III discusses the theories upon which the
criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant woman is based
and offers a critical analysis of such criminal prosecutions. The
analysis will show that the real effects from the criminal
prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women include not only
the subordination of women, but also more harm to the fetus.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE AND THE ISSUE OF
AUTONOMY
The constitutional question raised by the criminal prosecution
of drug addicted pregnant women is whether criminal sanctions
violate due process and equal protection. 5 Specifically, the issue
is whether criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant
women deprives women of their fundamental right to privacy and
personal autonomy.
deter drug use during pregnancy, but will also create a precedent for prosecuting a wide
array of harmful prenatal conduct, [i.e. poor sleep habits and failing to follow a doctor's
order]. Finally, opponents of criminal intervention assert that if the legal system
punishes pregnant drug users, pregnant women will be deterred from seeking prenatal
care from doctors out of fear of facing criminal charges);
Chan, supra note 2, 199-203 (discussing criminalization of drug abuse during pregnancy);
Nova D. Janssen, Note, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Using Drugs
during Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 741-45 (2000) (arguing that society should
impose criminal sanctions for women who use drugs during pregnancy).
4 See Christine M. Bulger, In the Best Interest of the Child? Race and Class
Discrimination in Prenatal Drug Use Prosecution, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 709, 725 -
26 (Spring 1999) (discussing three harmful effects of imposing criminal sanctions on
pregnant drug users: (1) detrimental effects on a baby when taken away from his/her
mother within first months of life; (2) potential expansion of state interference in
pregnant woman's conduct; and (3) opportunity for discrimination).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive an person of life, liberty, or property; without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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When faced with a constitutional question, the Court must first
define the fundamental right or rights at issue6 and then apply
the proper standard of review to ensure the legislation passes
constitutional muster.7  The United States Constitution
guarantees that fundamental rights are not to be abridged by
either federal or state legislation. 8 The standards of review used
by the Court to review legislation are strict scrutiny,9
intermediate scrutiny'0 and rational basis," depending upon the
6 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302-16 (1993); see also Collins v. Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (holding that "'[slubstantive due process analysis must first begin
with a careful description of the asserted right, for [tihe doctrine of judicial self-restraint
requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in
this field.'"). See generally Eric K Weingarten, An Indeterminate Mix of Due Process and
Equal Protection: The Undertow of In Forma Pauperis, 75 DENV. U.L. REV. 631, 631-40
(1998) (discussing intermingling of due process, fundamental rights, and equal protection
claims).
7 See U.S. CONST. art. III (discussing judicial power of Supreme Court shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under United States Constitution).
8 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, V, X1V (discussing no law shall be passed regarding
establishment of religion or prohibiting free exercise of religion, speech, press, assembly
and petition government; that no person shall be subject to unreasonable search and
seizures without probable cause; that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law and that no person shall be denied equal protection
under law).
9 See WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION CASES-
COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 476 (8th ed. 1996) (discussing that regulation dealing with
fundamental rights call for strict scrutiny review); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (discussing use of strict scrutiny when legislation involves fundamental
right). See generally Edward V. Heck, Constitutional Interpretation and a Court in
Transition: Strict Scrutiny from Shapiro v. Thompson to Dunn v. Blumstein - and
Beyond, 3 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 65, 65-81 (1992) (discussing evolution of strict scrutiny);
John Galloto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 508-26
(1993) (arguing that strict scrutiny should be used in gender discrimination cases).
10 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 - 206 (1976) (discussing intermediate
scrutiny, as applied to legislation which involves classification based on gender). See
generally David K Bowsher, Cracking the Code of United States v. Virginia, 48 DUKE L.J.
305, 305-19 (1998) (arguing that despite change in language from Supreme Court, gender-
based discrimination claims are subject to intermediate scrutiny); Christopher S. Miller,
The End Justifies the Means: Affirmative Action, Standards of Review, and Justice
Wnite, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1305, 1310-16 (1992) (discussing use of intermediate scrutiny
to uphold diversity interests).
11 See State v. Hutchins, 188 F.3d. 531, 541 (D.C.Cir. 1999) The three standards of
review are rational basis, strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny:
Under the rational basis standard, no fundamental right is at issue and the [court] would
only need to show a rational relationship between [the legislation] and any legitimate
government interest... [U]nder strict scrutiny standard, a fundamental right is
implicated and the [court] would have to show that the [legislation] is narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling government interest. To be narrowly tailored, there must be a
sufficient nexus between the compelling governmental interest and the provisions of the
[legislation] [citation omitted and the [legislation] must use the least restrictive
reasonable means to achieve its goals. Id.
Under intermediate scrutiny, the court acknowledges that existence of a fundamental
right but also recognizes an important government interest. It requires the [court] to
show the [legislation] is substantially related to the government interest. Id.; see also
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rights affected by the legislation.12 To define the fundamental
right or rights at issue in a particular piece of legislation and
apply the proper standard of review to determine its
constitutionality is a difficult task because there are often, as is
the case with the criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant
woman, rights in conflict.13 The rights in question regarding the
criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women are a
woman's fundamental right to privacy and the extent to which a
pregnant woman has this right before becoming over ridden by
the fetus' right to physical integrity.14 This creates a conflict
between a woman's right to personal autonomy against the fetus'
right to physical integrity and the State's interest in such
integrity for the protection of potential human life.i5
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d. 488, 493 (5th Cir. 1993) (defining term "narrowly tailored" as
legislation containing "nexus between the stated government interest and the
classification created by the ordinance.").
12 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1972) ("[A]lthough children generally
are protected by the same constitutional guarantees... as are adults, the State is entitled
to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability [by exercising broader
authority over their activities]."); see also Michael R. Bosse, Standards of Review: The
Meaning of Words, 49 ME. L. REV. 367, 373-74 (1997) (discussing standards of review
used by court). See generally Julie M. Amstein, United States v. Virgina: The Case of
Coeducation at Viria Military Institute, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 69, 81-82
(discussing case law development of intermediate scrutiny to review gender based
legislation).
13 See Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe
v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1002-06 (1999) (discussing conflicts between rights of fetus
and pregnant woman, and discussing action taken by States); see also Bosse, supra note
12, at 373 (discussing that different standards of review are used for different issues, and
policy rationales behind determinations to use such standards). See generally James
Basta, Supreme Court Review: Habeas Corpus: Unresolved Standard ofReview on Mixed
Questions for State Pisoners: Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992), 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 978, 978 (questioning standard of review to be used in habeas corpus cases).
14 See Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1009-15 (discussing historical development of rights
of woman to liberty and privacy as opposed to rights of fetus and State). See generally
Sarah Y. Lai and Regan E. Ralph, Recent Development: Female Sexual Autonomy and
Human Rights, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 201, 201 (1995) (arguing that under basic human
rights theories men and women are to be treated equally under law and not discriminated
against because of gender); Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the
Common-Law Protection for Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 489 (1998)
(discussing safeguards created by law to woman's right to personal autonomy).
15 See Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1014 ("[P]rosecutors across the country have relied
on the claimed existence of fetal rights as a basis for justifying the arrest and
imprisonment of pregnant women... cit[ing] ... wrongful death cases and fetal homicide
cases as a basis for treating fetuses as persons and treating... pregnant women... as
criminals."). See generally Lai, supra note 14, at 201 (discussing existing protections for
women's sexual autonomy); Northern, supra note 14, at 489 (arguing courts should do
more to protect woman's right to procreative autonomy).
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A. The Rights of Women
1. The Fundamental Right to Privacy and Liberty
The fundamental right asserted by women, pregnant or not,
drug addicted or not, is the right to privacy with regards to
choices about their bodies.16 Holding a drug addicted pregnant
woman criminally liable for fetal damage has concerned many
legal scholars with the effects such sanctions will have on the
women's rights.'7 Many legal scholars argue that if the state is
allowed to criminally prosecute women for drug use during
pregnancy, a flood gate will open allowing the state to criminally
prosecute pregnant women for not eating or sleeping correctly or
for the failure to follow a doctor's instructions.1 8 The endless
possibilities,19 cause severe detriment to a woman's right to
privacy and her ability to choose what to do with her body,
keeping the woman in a subordinate position.20
16 See generally Naomi Calm, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas
of Criminalization, 49 DEPAuL L. REV. 817, 821 (discussing subordination of women
through legislation that criminalizes or decriminalizes certain aspects of woman's life,
including woman's right to control her own body, woman's right to care for her children,
and woman's right to live safely). See generally Kimberly A. Johns, Reproductive Rights
of Women: Construction and Reality in International and United States Law, 5 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 22-26 (1998) (looking to United States Constitution for development of
women's reproductive rights, right to privacy with regards to their bodies).
17 See Sexton, supra note 1, at 411 (stating "[tihe American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) argues that the prosecution of pregnant women will not only fail to deter drug use
during pregnancy, but will also create a precedent for prosecuting a wide array of harmful
prenatal conduct... there would be nowhere to draw the line in regulating women's
behavior."); see also Bulger, supra note 4, at 724 (emphasizing possibilities for racial
discrimination with use of criminal sanctions against drug addicted pregnant women);
Loraine Schmall, Addicted Pregnancy as a Sex Crime, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263, 273
(Spring 1993) (discussing effects of criminal sanctions against drug addicted pregnant
women on woman's abortion rights); Rachel Roth, Woman News: What Future for
Reproductive Rights, Cai. TRIB., Feb. 23, 2000 (discussing women's "incredibly shrinking
sphere of reproductive control.").
18 See Roth, supra note 17, at 1 (discussing increase in reproductive control); see also
Schmall, supra note 17, at 273 (discussing criminal sanctions imposed upon drug addicted
pregnant women). See generally Johns, supra note 16, at 26-30 (discussing reality of
women's reproductive rights).
19 See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599,600
(January 1986) ("By creating an adversarial relationship between the woman and her
fetus, the [S]tate provides itself with a powerful means for controlling women's behavior
during pregnancy, thereby threatening women's fundamental rights.").
20 See Cahn, supra note 16, at 822 (emphasizing that particularly harsh
criminalization of women, mothers, furthers subordination of women). See generally
Johns, supra 16, at 27-29 (discussing limitations of women's reproductive rights); Berta
Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights-Rules, Realities and the
Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK J. INT'L L. 605, 605 (1996) (quoting
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The subordinate status of women in American law was founded
in both religious and secular sources, including Judeo-Christian
traditions,21 English common law, 22 the frontier conditions of
colonial America,2 3 and the American plantation economy of the
Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, "[firom the first dawn of life unto the grave, Poor
womankind's in every state a slave, We will our rights in learning's world maintain; Wilt's
empire now shall know a female reign," and demanding treatment of women as equals).
21 See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIs, GENDER AND LAW THEORY,
DocTRINE, COMMENTARY 1-16 (Aspen Law & Bus.2d ed. 1988) (discussing foundations for
women's subordinate status and ways in which they were reinforced in United States, i.e.
assumption in United States that men represented norm of full human being and women
represented deviation from norm, concept of women as property, and idea of male sphere
that is "public" - concerned with government, trade, business, and law - and female
sphere that is "private" - encompassing home, family, and child-rearing); see also Paula
Abrams, The Tradition offReproduction, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 475 (1995) (stating that in
Judaic Tradition "women gained the approval of both God and husband through
reproduction."); Marie A. Failinger, Gender, Justice and the Left Hand of God: A
Lutheran Perspective, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 45, 52 (1999) (stating that
some Christian denominations see scripture as justification for subordination of women.);
Angela L. Padilla & Jennifer J. Winrich, Christianity, Feminism, and the Law, 1 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 67, 70 n.18 (1991) (giving definition of Judeo-Christian tradition).
22 See Bartlett & Harris, supra note 21, at 1-16; see also In Re Bradwell, 1869 WL
5503, at *3 (IU.1869) (noting that "[iut is to be also remembered that female attorneys at
law were unknown in England, and a proposition that a woman should enter the courts of
Westminster Hall in that capacity, or as a barrister, would have created hardly less
astonishment than one that she should ascend the bench of Bishops, or be elected to a
seat in the House of Commons."), afl'd sub nom, Bradwell v. People of State of Illinois, 83
U.S. 130; Laura Sack, Women and Children First" A Feminist Analysis of the Primary
Caretaker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 294 (1992)
(stating that "[ulnder English common law, as under Roman law, children were the
property of their fathers."); Derek W. St.Pierre, The Transition from Property to People:
The Road to Recognition of Rights for Non-Human Animals, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
255, 266 (1998)(stating that "[flollowing English common law tradition, upon marriage
women lost their ability to sue, to own property and in general to gain any recognition in
the eyes of the law."). See generally Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury
Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1296 (2000) (stating that prohibition of women
from juries was derived from English Common law.); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Towards
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2000) (stating that English Common Law "permitted a
husband to beat his wife with a stick no wider than his thumb.").
23 See Bartlett & Harris, supra note 21, at 1-16; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equity, 74 IND. L.J. 1085 (1999) (stating that rape was
not considered crime in colonial times); R. Jason Richards, Disabilities in Notary Law
and Practice, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1999) (stating that "[diuring our
colonial period, English common law and custom, which governed the American colonies,
prohibited women from voting and from holding any public office."); David Schultz, Scalia
On Democratic Decision Making and Long Standing Traditions: How Rights Always Lose,
31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 319, 343 (1997) (stating that sexism is deeply rooted in American
history dating back to colonial times); Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in
America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 368 (1989) (stating that legal values of Colonial America
were rooted in patriarchal values of English common law); John Fabian Witt, From Loss
of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort
Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 717,
727 (2000) (stating that "[c]olonial governments resisted female land ownership, even for
unmarried women, [so that] women who became too economically independent frequently
found themselves the objects of community attack", such as disproportionate witchcraft
accusations).
2002] PROSECUTION OF DR UG ADDICTED PREGNANT WOMEN 273
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century South.24 One of the most
powerful tools of subordination was the defining of sexual
norms, 25 allowing for the sexual exploitation of slaves,26 the
control of women's reproduction through bans on birth control
and abortion,27  domestic violence and laws against
24 See Bartlett & Harris, supra note 21, at 1-16; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism
and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 9 (1993)
(stating that plantation owners degraded their wives by having sexual relations with
slave women); Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: "Passing" Revisited and
Demystification as a Critical Practice, 18 YALE L. & POLY REV. 297, 313 (discussing
subordinate status of White women in American South). But see Lundy Langston, Force
African-American Fathers to Parent Their Delinquent Sons - A Factor to Be Considered
at the Dispositional Stage, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173, 187 (1994) (stating that in slave
family woman's role was more important than that of her husband); Martha Minow,
Forming Underneath Everything that Grows: Toward a History of FamilyLaw, 1985 Wis.
L. REV. 819, 856 (1985) (stating that widows enjoyed certain degree of social
independence in plantation economy in nineteenth century).
25 See Bartlett & Harris, supra note 21, at 39-49 (discussing societal perceptions as to
what is sexually "normal" for males and females, including excerpts from CorroU Smith-
Rosenberg's book Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian America, Horatio
Robinson Storer's book Why Not? A Book for Every Woman, a Plymouth Massachusetts
case of 1649, in which two women were tried for act of sodomy and let off with minimal
punishment of public humiliation as opposed death penalty imposed for male to male
sodomy); see also Corroll Smith-Rosenberg, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN
VICTORIAN AMERICA 208-16 (A- A. Knopf 1985) (discussing how diagnosis of hysteria was
used to define woman's role and personality in nineteenth century); Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 488 (1999) (stating that in nineteenth
century "women who did not conform to expected gender roles" were considered deviants);
Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297,
1344-45 (1998) (discussing 1866 essay by Horatio Robinson Storer, leader of nineteenth-
century campaign against abortion, "that compared the fertile female body to America's
Great Plains and warned native-born white women that 'the future destiny of the nation'
depended upon their relative birth rates.").
26 See Bartlett & Harris, supra note 21, at 39-49 (discussing article in Harvard
Women's Law Journal article by Karen A. Getman entitled Sexual Control in the
Slaveholding South: The Implementation and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System). See
generally Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The
Thirteenth Amendment's Role in the Struggle for Reproductive RJghts, 3 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 401, 411 (2000) (stating that slave breeding was "systematic sexual and
reproductive exploitation of female slaves made possible by force, coercion and
oppression."); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 599 (1990) (stating that "[diuring slavery, the rape of a black woman
by any man, white or black, was simply not a crime."); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and
the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1336 n.143 (1998) (defining essential
features of slavery).
27 See Bartlett & Harris, supra note 21, at 39-49; Bartlett, supra note 25, at 488
(stating "link between restrictions on the medical practice of abortion that were in place
in the nineteenth century and the desire to maintain women in their "place" are
particularly well documented."); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1973) (stating
that American anti-abortion laws were "product of a Victorian social concern to
discourage illicit sexual conduct."); Thomas L. Jipping, From Least Dangerous Branch to
Most Profound Legacy. The High Stakes in Judicial Selection, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 365,
395 (2000) (stating that "every state during the nineteenth century had banned abortions
except to save the mother's life."). But see Carol S. Weisman & Trude Bennett, Women's
Health Care: Activist Traditions and Institutional Change, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L.
582, 584 (2000) (stating that abortions were not illegal in United States until mid-
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miscegenation. 28  Legal scholars argue that the criminal
prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women is simply another
way in which women are kept in a subordinate position.29
From Aristotle30 to contemporary song lyrics, 31 women have
been thought of as inferior to men, keeping women in a
subordinate position in society.32 An illustration of the difference
in treatment between men and women, keeping women in a
subordinate position, involves child support obligations. 33 A
nineteenth century).
28 See Bartlett & Harris, supra note 21, at 39-49 (discussing 1883 case State v.
Jackson, in which court held that State had right to regulate interracial marriages); see
also Harris, supra note 26, at 600 (stating that "[slouthern miscegenation laws were part
of a patriarchal system through which white men maintained their control over the bodies
of all black people."); Trina Jones, Shades ofBrown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J.
1487, 1502 (2000) (stating that anti-miscegenation statutes began to appear as early as
1662); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 555, 564 (2000) (stating that central objective of early "American law and social
convention was keeping the white bloodline free from Black contamination.").
29 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 282-83 (emphasizing different standards of care to
which fathers are held as opposed to mother); see also Deborah J. Krauss, Regulating
Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights Theory on Childbirth Decision and
Women of Color, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 523, 539 (1991) (arguing that state imposed
choice between abortion or criminal prosecution for drug use turns addicted pregnant
woman into "a second-class citizen possessing constitutional rights inferior to those of
men and nonpregnant women."); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, And the Bigt of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1481 (1991) (arguing that "state's decision to punish drug-addicted mothers rather than
help them stems from [their] poverty and race of the defendants and society's denial of
their full dignity as human beings.").
30 See Bartlett & Harris, supra note 21, at 3 (citing COMPLETE WORKS OF ARIsTOTLE,
vol. 2, at 2131) (Jonathan Barnes ed., ev. Oxford ed. 1984) ("[N]ature has made the one
sex stronger, the other weaker, that the latter through fear may be the more cautious,
while the former by its courage is better able to ward off attacks.., and... acquire
possessions outside the house, while the other preserve those within."); see also Mark C.
Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 249, 267 n. 81 (2000) (stating that "Aristotle's women were idiots in the Greek
sense of the word."); Deborah M. Thaw, The Feminization of the Office of Notary Public:
From Feme Covert to Notaire Covert, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 703, 708 (1998) (stating
that Aristotle "maintained that men alone realize themselves as citizens, whereas women
realize themselves only within the confines of the household.").
31 See also No DOUBT, I'M JUST A GIRL (Trauma Records 1997) (discussing "girl in the
world" who is sick of being treated differently because of her gender and including lyrics
such as, "Oh, I'm just a girl. So don't let me have any rights ... don't let me out of your
sight.., don't let me drive late at night. I'm just a girl. I guess I'm some kind-a freak.
The way they all sit and stare with those eyes.").
32 See Cahn, supra note 13, at 822 (discussing the subordinate position of women in
society). See generally Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences and the Supreme
Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 915-17 (1983) (discussing effect of constitutional adjudication on
sex roles in America); Earl M. Maltz, Sex Discrimination in the Supreme Court - A
Comment on Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 1985 DUKE L.J. 177,
177 (1985) (commenting on work by Freedman regarding effect of Supreme Court
adjudications on efforts to redefine sex roles).
33 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 284-87. The author discusses the differences in
treatment between men and women with regards to child support obligations. "The
disparity between women and men exists even in judicial custody determinations.
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father, delinquent in child support obligations, who is brought
before a family court judge is rarely, if ever, incarcerated because
of "a perception that putting men in jail will net no real support
money for the children."34 In contrast, courts seem all to ready
too incarcerate a pregnant woman.35 Other examples include the
fact that men are not arrested for child abuse or neglect "after
having taken illegal drugs that are known to adversely affect
sperm.36 Nor are there reported cases of removing children from
the custody of a father who is arrested for drunk driving, or
possession and use of cocaine, or use of a dangerous weapon"
while caring for his children.37 The incarceration of the female
and not the male further reinforces the gender distinctions and
disparate treatment.38
Judicial decisions removing a child from a mother or assuming a mother who tests
positive for drugs is neglectful fail to make a substantive inquiry into the mother's actual
fitness." Id. See generally David H. Gans, Stereotyping and Differences: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1877
(1995) The author argues that the "Supreme Court has consistently held that state laws
and practices reflecting stereotypical assumptions about women's proper roles are invalid
under the Equal protection Clause." Id.
34 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 284-87. "Its [the incarceration of fathers delinquent
in child support payments]... depends upon its efficacy in specific and general
deterrence... citing Robert Mnookin & D. Kelly Weisberg, Child, Family and State 234
(1989)." Id.
35 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 287 (discussing the one [emphasis added] case in
which court found father had responsibility to his unborn child, although not punishable
by incarceration if responsibility was not met). But see In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d
741, 749 (Fla. 1998) (holding that unmarried father did not have right to interfere with
mother of his child's decision to place their illegitimate child for adoption because father
did not support mother while she was pregnant, evidencing his intent to abandon child);
Alison E. Grossman, Strking Down Fetal Protection Poicies: A Feminist VictoryZ 77 VA.
L. REV. 1607, 1607-09 (1991) (discussing Supreme Court decision putting rights of woman
ahead of fetus).
36 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 288. See generally Diane F. Halpern, Public Policy
Implications of Sex Differences in Cognitive Abilities, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. AND L. 561,
561 (1996) (discussing differing standardized test scores between the sexes).
37 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 313 (questioning disparate treatment between men
and women, fathers and mothers, with regards to care of their children). See generally
Sherri L. Thornton, The Equalization of Spousal Benefits in View of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 27 HOW. L.J. 653, 658 (1984) (discussing Supreme Court
decision regarding disparate treatment based on pregnancy).
uSee Coe v. County of Cook, 1997 WL 797662, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (discussing rights of
potential father as against mother's right to obtain abortion); see also In the matter of
Alfredo S. 172 A.2d 528 (holding that although father had admitted to recreational
cocaine use up to four months prior to birth of child, these were not "extraordinary
circumstances" as to warrant denial of custody to natural parent). See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory. Feminism Unmodified, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826,
826-29 (1988) (discussing force of feminist movement and belief that movement is just
beginning). But see Phyllis Schlafly, Gender Symposium: How the Feminists Want to
Change Our Laws, 2 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 65, 65-66 (1994) (questioning motivations of
feminists).
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Women's rights advocates argue the criminal prosecution of
drug addicted pregnant women is a violation of a woman's
fundamental right to privacy created in Roe v. Wade.39 In Roe,
the Court held that the right to privacy:
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon [S]tate
action,... or... in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.4 0
If the right to privacy includes a woman's choice to terminate
her pregnancy, should it not include a woman's actions while she
is pregnant?
The right to privacy guaranteed by the Constitution extends to
both women and men, regardless of their biological differences.4 1
It is nature that dictates only a woman is to possess the biological
necessities to become pregnant.4 2 Therefore, this difference
should not deprive her of the fundamental right to privacy. 43 A
39 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
40 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (discussing detriment State would impose on pregnant
woman by denying her choice to terminate her pregnancy, including psychological,
mental, and physical distress caused by additional offspring).
41 See Schiall, supra note 17, at 306 (emphasizing it is woman's biological difference
targeted by coercive actions against drug addicted pregnant women). See generaLly James
Denison, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Pumishment for Maternal
Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1131 (1991) (stating only gender distinguishes
female offenders from their male counterparts in fetal abuse laws); Nancy K. Schiff,Legisiation Punishing Drug Use during Pregnancy: Attack on Women's Rights in the
Name of Fetal Prtection, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197, 218 (1991) (arguing it is
discriminatory to hold only women responsible for fetal harm and pointing to studies
demonstrating that male drug and alcohol abuse contribute to abnormal fetal
development). But see Margaret P. Spencer, Prosecutorial Immunity: The Response to
Prenatal Drug Use, 25 CONN. L. REV. 393, 413 (1993) (arguing gender-based
classification cannot be established because state action against pregnant drug users does
not single out all women for disparate treatment).
42 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 306 (discussing biological differences of women,
allowing only women to become pregnant); see also Ruth Colker, The Female Body and
the Law: On Truth and Lies, 99 YALE L.J. 1159, 1174 (1990) (pointing out that all women
are affected by pregnancy based discrimination because all women have capacity to
become pregnant); Elizabeth L. Thompson, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct
during Pregnancy: A Decision Making Model for Lawyers, 64 IND. L.J. 357, 362 (1989)
(stating that attempts to justify criminal prosecution of women for prenatal fetal abuse
are based on unique relationship between woman and unborn fetus); Note, Rethinking
Motherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1325, 1339 (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter RethinkingMotherhood] (pointing to inseparability of
maternal and fetal interests as determinative of women's vulnerability to intrusive
government action).
43 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 306-08 (discussing woman's constitutional right to
privacy and impediments placed upon this right by criminal prosecution of drug addicted
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woman, pregnant or not, must be able to enjoy the "right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by the civilized man."44 The United States Constitution
guarantees that no state shall deprive any "person" of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law and a guarantee
that no state shall deny any "person" equal protection of the
laws.45 Is a woman not a "person" simply because she has the
capacity to bear a child? Quite to the contrary, a woman is a
"person" protected by and entitled to the basic guarantees of the
Constitution. 46
The criminal prosecution of a pregnant woman who may use
drugs during her pregnancy denies all women their
constitutional right to privacy.47 In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey48 the Supreme Court stated that "the Constitution places
pregnant women); see also Dawn Johnson, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental
Regulation ofPrgnant Women's Lives after Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 199-200
(1989) (arguing that any governmental intrusion that singles out pregnant women
implicates women's fundamental right to privacy); Sylvia A. Law, Rethini Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1007 (1984) (arguing sex equality doctrine must
distinguish between laws that differentiate along gender-based lines and laws governing
reproductive biology). See generally Janet Golden, "A Tempest in a Cocktail Glass":
Mothers, Alcohol, and Television, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 473, 473-80 (June 2000)
(providing numerous examples of news broadcasts in which pregnant women who
consumed alcohol during their pregnancy were depicted as danger to society).
44 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 306-08 (arguing that coercive actions deny women
their constitutional rights to liberty and privacy) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928)) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
45 See U.S.CONST. amend. XIV.
46 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 306-08 (discussing constitutional rights of women);
see also Donna L. Casto, Wh2itner v. South Carolina: Prosecution for Child Abuse Extends
into the Womb, 48 S.C. L. REV. 657, 667 (1997) (pointing out that since Supreme Court
has not accorded rights provided to 'person" to fetus, fundamental rights of mother should
outweigh those of fetus). See generally Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Prosecution of
Mothers of Drug Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
505, 508-09 (1990) (discussing how statutory language applied by courts in cases
involving live-born children of drug-addicted mothers is noticeably free of determinations
of beginning of personhood). But see Regina M. Coady, Extending Child Abuse Protection
to the Viable Fetus: Whitner v. State of South Carolina, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 667, 680
(1997) (discussing fetal rights movement and pointing out that most damage attributable
to mother's drug use occurs in early stages of pregnancy).
47 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 306-08 (arguing that criminal prosecution of drug
addicted pregnant women deprives women of their fundamental right to privacy). But see
Nova D. Janssen, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Using Drugs During
Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 765 (2000) (pointing out that even the Roe Court
questioned whether previously articulated right to privacy is equivalent to unlimited
right to do with one's body as one pleases); Julia Elizabeth Jones, State Intervention in
Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REv. 1159, 1168 (1992) (stating that statute punishing women for
giving birth to drug-addicted babies is either gender-based or based on pregnancy,
requiring in either case only intermediate level scrutiny and probably surviving equal
protection challenge).
48 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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limits on a [Sitate's right to interfere with a person's most basic
decisions about family and parenthood."49 If a woman, more
specifically a pregnant woman, is a "person" as defined and
protected under the Constitution, then the State's right to
interfere in her familial decisions is limited.50 Therefore, a
State's right to interfere in a woman's decisions while she is
pregnant is also limited, if not unacceptable, as a violation of a
woman's fundamental right to privacy.51
In addition to her fundamental right to privacy, a woman, as a
"person" protected by the Constitution, also enjoys the
fundamental right of liberty.52  In Thornburgh v. National
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,53 the Court stated
that the "Constitution embodies a promise that [a] certain
private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond
the reach of government," extending to both men and women.5 4
One of the "private spheres of individual liberty" kept beyond the
49 See id. at 908; see also Schmall, supra note 17, at 307 (citing in fa. 159 United
States Supreme Court cases in which Court outlines some of rights possessed by people
with regards to family and parenthood); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440
(1972) (holding statute that prohibited unmarried persons from obtaining contraceptives
invalid and rejecting distinction between married people and unmarried people as
irrational; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-85 (1965) (holding State law which
prohibited use of contraceptives by married people unconstitutional and establishing
fundamental right to privacy in family matters); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534 - 35 (1925) (furthering parents right to make educational decisions for their children
by invalidating State prohibitions of private religious schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 390-403 (1923) (holding parents have the right to make educational decisions for
their children).
50 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 307 (discussing number of United States Supreme
Court cases in which Court defines and protects "persons" right to make decisions
regarding his/her family). See generally Meera Worth, Note, Spousal Notification and the
Right of P ivacy Scbeinberg v. Smith, 59 CmH.-KENT L. REv. 1129, 1129-31 (1983) (stating
state interference with individual's right to privacy involving domestic relations is not
free from constitutional restraints); Juhi Mehta, Note, Prosecuting Parents under
Fornication Statutes: A Constitutionally Suspect Legal Solution to the Social Problem of
Teen Pregnancy, 5 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 126-27 (1998) (arguing fundamental
rights of women in childbearing exists and extends to minors, therefore state must show
compelling state interest in criminalizing consensual sex between minors).
51 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 307 (arguing that State's interference with woman's
decisions while she is pregnant is violation of woman's fundamental right to privacy); see
also Carol Jean Sovinski, The Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse: A Quick Fix
to a Complex Problem, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 107, 118-19 (stating prosecution of women for
their behavior during pregnancy implicates right to privacy); Worth, supra note 50, at
1131.
52 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 307 (discussing constitutional right of liberty).
53 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
54 See id. at 772; see also Schmall, supra note 17, at 307; James R. Schueller, Note,
The Use of Cocaine by Pregnant Women: Child Abuse or Choice, 25 J. LEGIS. 163, 176
(1999) (referring to large areas of privacy outside sphere of government intrusion).
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reach of the government is a woman's right to procreate.5 5 This
fundamental right of liberty should extend to a woman's actions
while she is in the process of procreation - while she is
pregnant.56 The criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant
women not only subordinates women, depriving them of their
fundamental rights to privacy and liberty, but also destroys their
right to personal autonomy.57
2. The Woman's Right to Personal Autonomy
The right asserted by women, pregnant or not, drug addicted
or not, is the right to personal autonomy. 58 Personal autonomy is
the right to be free from interference by others and the ability to
flourish among and in relation to others. 59 A woman's right to
55 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (discussing Oklahoma criminal
statute that sterilizes "habitual criminal" as depriving persons of their basic liberty to
marry and procreate); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (discussing person's
fundamental right to marry extends to any person he or she chooses). See generaly Reed
v. Campagnolo, 810 F. Supp. 167, 169 (Md. Dist. Ct. 1993) (discussing wrongful birth
cause of action, giving parents of child born with birth defects right to sue doctor for
negligence which denied them opportunity to abort pregnancy).
56 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 308-09 (discussing fundamental right of liberty
possessed by women during pregnancy). But see Schueller, supra note 54, at 176 (stating
constitutional rights and liberty interests do not include right to use drugs during any
state of pregnancy and laws prohibiting such do not burden fundamental rights).
57 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 309 ("Because our notions of liberty are inextricably
entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often
deemed [Sitate incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due
Process Clause,") (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 305 (1990)) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Chan, supra note 16, at 821
(discussing negative impact of criminalization on women's' bodily integrity). But see
Chan, supra, note 2, at 223 (arguing that criminalization of drug use during pregnancy
would not unduly burden women's' right to bodily autonomy but would serve state's
interest in protecting potential life).
58 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 309; see also Blair D. Condoll, Extending
Constitutional Protection to the Viable Fetus: A Woman's Right to Privacy, 22 S.U. L.
REV. 149, 158 (1994) (stating that personal autonomy is "cherished" value in Anglo-
American law); Michele D. Wilkins, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse: An
Anatysis of Pui'tive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1421-22 (1990)
(discussing rights to personal autonomy). See generally Rose Ash and Kathleen Watt,
Editorial, Paying Female Addicts to Be Sterilized Is a Faustian Pact, PRESS-ENTERPRISE,
July 3, 1998, at A09 (discussing pregnant woman's right of personal autonomy).
59 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 804 (discussing definition of autonomy); see also
James R. Bopp, Jr. and Daniel Avila, Perspectives on Cruzan: The Sirens' Lure of
Invented Consent: A Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate Decision Making for Legally-
Incapacitated Older Persons, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 779, 798-99 (1991) (defining personal
autonomy in moral context as "personal rule of the self by adequate understanding while
remaining free from controlling interference by others"); Daniel 0. Conkle, Legal Theory:
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1194 n.
209 (1988) (defining personal autonomy as "individual freedom to control one's own
decision making"); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in
the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 446-47 (1983) (discussing derivation of
definition of personal autonomy and application to individual persons).
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autonomy is her right to be her own sovereign. 60 Women's
advocates argue that the criminal prosecution of drug addicted
pregnant women threatens the personal autonomy of women
because it allows the state to interfere with a woman's body
while she is pregnant, 61 keeping her in a subordinate position.62
In the 1970's, in an effort to end the subordination of and
enhance the autonomy of women, academic scholars began to
challenge the law's claim to neutrality, rationality, and
objectivity.63  Laws that were enacted under the guise of
protecting women, and thus claimed by the state to be rational,
often resulted in threatening a woman's right to personal
autonomy.64  In a 1981 case, Michael M v Superior Court of
60 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 804 (discussing meaning of personal autonomy to
woman); see also Information Is Vital, CIu. DAILY HERALD, Aug. 13, 2000, at 13
(discussing reproductive choice as extension of woman's personal autonomy). See
generally Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 634 (1990)
(discussing woman's right to autonomy in context of reproductive rights); Tara Rayne
Shewchuk, Regulation of Pre-Conception Agreements: A Synthesis of Individual Rights
and Community Values, 1 HEALTH L.J. 147, 166-77 (1993) (discussing that woman's right
to autonomy includes reproductive choices).
61 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 804; see also Page McGuire Linden, Drug Addiction
during Pregnancy: A Call for Increased Social Responsibility, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW
105, 111 (1995) (discussing problems with criminal prosecution as it relates to individual
rights). See generally Johnson, supra note 19, at 600 (discussing threats to women's
fundamental rights). But cf Wilkins, supra note 58, at 1426 (advocating that criminal
prosecution statutes would survive strict scrutiny if narrowly drawn).
62 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 804; see also Calm, supra note 16, at 821 (discussing
subordination of women); see also Caroline Morris, Technology and the Legal Discourse of
FetalAutonomy, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 51 (1997) (discussing subordination of women
due to enhanced fetal rights); Barbara Hewson, A Women's Freedom under Attack,
TIMES, July 8, 1997 (stating that fetal rights proponents argue that "pregnant women are
a subordinate class"). See generally Bobbi C. Sternheim, Shaping Social Justice, Law
Advances Women's Rights through Litigation, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1992, at S-8 (stating that
traditionally law has "perpetrated the subordinate status of women").
63 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 804 (discussing effort by women and scholars to end
subordination by challenging neutrality, rationality and objectivity of law). See generally
Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 16 F.3d 1455,
1464 (6th Cir.) (1994) (Batchelder, J., concurring) (discussing link between neutrality and
objectivity); Berta Esperanza Herandez-Truyol, Virtual Equality as Constitutional
ReaLity: An Introduction, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 1, 4 (1995) (discussing
rationality, neutrality and objectivity as myth in law); Marcela V. Rodriguez, Pedagogy
and Law: Ideas for Integrating Gender into Legal Education, 7 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC.
PoLY & L. 267, 273 (1999) (discussing the law and preserving its "objectivity,
rationality... and neutrality").
64 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 804 (discussing threats to woman's right to personal
autonomy through laws enacted to protect women); see also Linda Farber Post,
Mandatory Testing of Pregnant Women an Newborns: HIAV, Drug Use, and Welfare
Policy: Bioethical Consideration of Maternal-Fetal Issues, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757
(1997) (discussing implications of state regulations on maternal rights); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 359, 388 n. 83
(1993) (discussing reservations about using rape law to protect women). See generally
Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency. Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40
WM. AND MARY L. REV. 805, 840-45 (discussing relationship between gender specific laws
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Sonoma County,65 the court held a statutory rape law that
criminally prosecuted males only, as the aggressors in sex, for
the act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife under the
age of eighteen, did not violate Equal Protection because the
difference in treatment of males and females was necessary to
"equalize" the physiological differences between men and
women. 66 In this pious attempt by the Court to "equalize" the
differences between men and women, the Court severely
inhibited a woman's right to personal autonomy.67 The Court
stripped the power of consent from the female under the age of
eighteen and in the process maintained control over the female
body, eighteen or older.68
The principle of equal treatment and formal equality brought
and women).
65 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding that statutory rape statute that imposes criminal
sanctions solely on males serves as equalizer of deterrents to engage in sexual intercourse
between sexes); see also Bartlett, supra note 21, at 804-24.
66 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 809 ("The Constitution surely does not require a
State to pretend that demonstrable differences between men and women do not really
exist."); see also Linda Beckman, Student Work: Chemical Castration: Constitutional
Issues ofDue Process, Equal Protection, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 100 W. VA.
L. REV. 853, 868-69 (1998) (applying holding in Michael M. as to physiological differences
to chemical treatment); Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginials New
Gender Equal Protection Analysis with Remifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title
V/, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845, 872-82 (1997) (discussing cases that recognize and consider
physiological differences between men and women); James McCollum, Case Development:
Constitutional Law - - Statutory Rape - - Gender-Based Classification Regarding
Statutory Rape Law Is Not Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 HOW. L.J. 341, 351-64 (1982) (discussing
holding of case as to physiological differences).
67 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 807 (discussing woman's right to personal
autonomy); see also Alda Facio, The Law: An Art or a Science, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 355, 366 (1998) (explaining that when laws are promulgated to take women
into account or grant them right, they may actually be do more harm to women);
Jonathan Todres, Prosecuting Sex Tour Operators in US. Courts in an Effort Reduce the
Sexual Exploitation of Children Globally, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5 (Fall 1999) (noting
that scholars believe Mann Act, which was designed to help women, actually inhibits
their rights). See generally, David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil
Liberties, 1999 U. Cmi. LEGAL F. 133, 133-35 (1999) (standing for general proposition that
discrimination laws should not be passed if they impinge on fundamental rights).
68 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 807 (discussing subordination of women); see also
Mary Anne Case, Symposium, Discrimination and Inequality Emerging Issues -The Very
Stereotype the Law Condemns: Constitutional Sex Discrmination Law as a Quest for
Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1460 (July 2000) (discussing while combat and
draft exclusion for women can be viewed as benefit, it results in concrete deprivation of
opportunity, citizenship value, inclusion and rights); Suzanne Sangree, TYtle IX and the
Contact Sport Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV.
381, 440 (Winter 2000) (stating that Title IX contact sports exemption reconfirms
stereotype that women are inferior and restricts their rights to integrate with men in
contact sports). See generally Cahn, supra note 16, at 818 ("Because women are so closely
identified with their children, they are treated particularly harshly for alleged crimes
against their children.").
STJOtN'SJOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
about a change in the law.69 The theory of formal equality
explains that, "individuals who are alike should be treated alike,
according to their actual characteristics rather than stereotypical
assumptions made about them."70 Under this theory, and after
reevaluating the rationale used in the upholding of the statutory
rape law in the Michael M. case,71 many jurisdictions have either
abolished or changed the law. Liability for consensual sex is
imposed only if there is a large age difference between the parties
and the "victim" is under the statutory age of consent. 72
Statutory rape laws were not the only laws by which a woman
was deprived of personal autonomy. 73  Rape, abortion and
69 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 101 (discussing change in law brought about by
equal treatment and theory of formal equality); see also Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1118, 1121 (Oct. 1986) (critiquing use of equality analysis as transformative device for
challenging social and economic subordination of women). But see Mary Becker,
Patriarchy and Inequalitj Towards a Substantive Feminsm, 1999 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 21,
21 (1999) (stating that formal equality cannot seriously challenge patriarchy); Kathleen
Mahoney, Theoretical Perspectives of Women's Human Rights and Strategies for Their
Implementation, 21 BROOYK J. INT'L L. 799, 800 (1996) (arguing fundamental equality
theory cannot properly address issues because it is based on false assumption that basic
institutions of society are fair).
70 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 101; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127(1994);
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Fronterio v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
71 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 822 (arguing some scholars believe change in
statutory rape law is not due to recognition of female autonomy but instead to recognition
of changing societal attitudes toward male sexuality). But see Mahoney, supra note 69, at
800 (discussing radical feminist analysis of rape). See generally David P. Bryden, Forum
on the Law of Rape: Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. REV. 317, 379 (2000) (discussing
rape law as gender discrimination).
72 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 819-20 (discussing "promiscuity defense" to crime of
statutory rape as existing way in which modem courts continue to maintain control over
female body, robbing her of personal autonomy by allowing "intrusive and value-laden
inquiry into the victim's sexual past."); see also MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-65 (2000)
(removing from rape charges anyone within thirty-six months of minor if perpetrator is
seventeen and over, or twenty-four months if perpetrator is under seventeen); ARK STAT.
ANN. § 5-14-103 (1999) (making affirmative defense to rape that perpetrator be within
two years of victim who is fourteen or less); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West. 1997) ("[Ain
act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is not more than three years older or
three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of a misdemeanor, whereas any person
over the age of 21 years who engages in unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under
16 years of age may be guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony."); Donald A. Dripps,
Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference between Presence of Force and the Absence of
Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, passim (Nov. 1992) (re-evaluating rape).
73 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 819-20 (discussing impact of statutory rape laws on
women); Margaret A. Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 47, n. 283 (Spring 1997) (discussing Catherine Mackinnon's feminist critique of
privacy as depriving women of identity, autonomy, control and self-definition). See
generally Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson from the
Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 948 (1999) (discussing effect of Roe v. Wade in making
abortion exclusively women's decision as endorsing sexist notion that men have non
interest in birth and that it should be woman's problem).
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pregnancy laws, all laws created for the supposed protection of
women, threatened a woman's right to personal autonomy. 74
Although formal equality may seem to promote the protection of
a woman's right to personal autonomy, it may actually result in
the unequal treatment of women. 75 The imposition of criminal
sanctions against drug addicted pregnant women, solely because
they are women who are pregnant and therefore should be
treated alike, may result in a rationale that allows for the
differential treatment of women because of their common
capacity to become pregnant. 76
When a woman becomes pregnant, her rights to privacy,
liberty and personal autonomy conflict with the rights of a
fetus.77  Many jurisdictions disagree on the issue of rights
possessed by a fetus. 78  The disagreement begins with the
74 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 819-20 (discussing woman's right to personal
autonomy). See generally Bernstein, supra note 67, passim (standing for general
proposition that discrimination laws should not be passed if they impinge on fundamental
rights); Facio, supra note 67, at 366 (explaining that when laws are promulgated to take
women into account or grant them right, they may actually be do more harm to women);
Todres, supra note 67, at 5 (noting that scholars believe Mann Act, which was designed to
help women, actually inhibits their rights).
75 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 819-20 (discussing formal equality). But see Becker,
supra note 69, at 21 (stating that formal equality cannot seriously challenge patriarchy);
Mahoney, supra note 69, at 799 (arguing fundamental equality theory cannot properly
address issues because it is based on false assumption that basic institutions of society
are fair). See generally Finley, supra note 69, at 1121 (critiquing use of equality analysis
as transformative device for challenging social and economic subordination of women).
76 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 819-20 (discussing formal equality); see also Linden,
supra note 51, at 110-118 (drawing upon tenets of cultural feminist theory to advocate
solutions which not only recognize that interests of mother and fetus are compatible,
rather than conflicting, but also recognize societal duty to aid substance-addicted
pregnant women); Schmall supra, note 17, at 308-09 (arguing criminal prosecution of
drug addicted pregnant women treats women differently due to their biological ability to
become pregnant); Jean Reith Schroedel, Pamela Fiber & Bruce D. Snyder, Women's
R'ghts and Fetal Personhood in Criminal Law, 7 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 89, 90
(2000) (noting that "idea of protection is still involved to circumscribe rights of women
based on their biological and social roles.").
77 See also Kary Moss, Substantive Abuse during Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
278, 286 (1990) (arguing that when society chooses to punish pregnant women for their
drug use, it opens door to placement of additional restrictions on women's behavior during
pregnancy); Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1004 ("The prosecutions of pregnant women
represent a significant threat to reproductive freedom. . . ."); Schmall, supra note 17, at
308-12 (discussing conflicts between woman's right to privacy, liberty and personal
autonomy and rights of fetus). See generally Schroedel, supra note 76, at 96-99
(examining three major areas of criminal law that deal with question of fetal rights:
abortion, substance abuse by pregnant women, and prenatal battering/third party fetal
killing).
78 See Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1004-08 (discussing South Carolina's approach to
protecting rights of fetus through use of State's criminal child endangerment statute, and
discussing estimated two hundred women have been prosecuted around country on
different jurisdictions theories of fetal abuse); see also Joseph R. Henry, Laura E. Gomez,
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question of whether a jurisdiction should recognize that a fetus
possesses any rights. If so, the issue becomes, at what point does
a fetus develop this right? Thus, creating the battle over fetal
rights.
B. The Battle Over Fetal Rights
The right in question with regards to the fetus is simply
whether the fetus has the right to physical integrity.79 The
answer, however, is difficult. 80 Jurisdictions "battle" over the
correct answer to the question regarding fetal rights,81 resulting
in an answer that varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 82
Misconceiving Mothers: Legislators, Prosecutors, and the Politics of Prenatal Drug
Exposure, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 207, 208-16 (discussing California's approach to
prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty
and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 406 (1983)
(noting social and scientific developments currently drawing attention to meaning and
scope of positive rights of both parties).
79 See Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973) (discussing rights, if any, possessed by
fetus); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2597 (2000) (utilizing principle that
subsequent to viability, states in promoting their interest in potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate abortion except where it is necessary for preservation of
mother's life or health); Johnsen, supra note 19, at 599 (offering that relevant legal
question ought not to be whether fetus is 'alive' from the moment of conception, or
moment of viability, etc., as if question were one of solely natural rather than social
decision); Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1002-06 (discussing conflict between rights of fetuses
and pregnant women, and examining action taken by states).
80 See Albert R. Jonsen, Transition from Fetus to Infant: A Problem for Law and
Ethics, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 697, 697 (May 1986) (concluding that "issues in Procreational
Autonomy, demands something unusual: the topic evokes profound personal emotions,
excites bitter social debates, draws upon a long tradition of moral reflection, and raises
deeply embedded principles of the common law."); see also Gina Kolata, Bias Seen against
Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at A13 (citing expert statements indicating
most women prosecuted for using illegal drugs while pregnant have been poor members of
racial minorities, even though drug use in pregnancy is equally prevalent in white
middle-class women). See generally Julia Epstein, Symposium, The Sacred Body in Law
and Literature: the Pregnant Imagination, Fetal Rights, and Women's Bodies, 7 YALE J.L.
& HuMAN. 139, 141 (analyzing historical underpinnings of modern view of pregnancy in
attempt to understand recent trend toward criminalizing pregnant women's behavior or
status in relation to their gestating fetus).
81 See Jonsen, supra note 80, at 697 (stating that '[tihe fetus in utero and the infant
extra uterum are affected radically and ultimately, for law and policy can mean for them
life and death."); see also Johnsen, supra note 19, at 600-601 (noting state creation of
adversarial relationship between women and their fetuses as means of controlling
women's behavior during pregnancy); Tamar Lewin, Abuse Laws Cover a Fetus, a High
Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997, at A22 (reporting South Carolina's high court
ruling that upholds criminal prosecution of pregnant women who used drugs, noting that
decision runs contrary to every other state supreme court that has addressed issue);
Isabel Wilkerson, Woman Cleared after Dug Use in Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1991,
at A15 (noting Michigan appeals court ruling that women should not stand trial on
charges of delivering cocaine to newborns through umbilical cord).
82 See Supreme Court Has Limited State Interest in Potential le, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 2000, at C15 (discussing public debate over fetal rights with reference
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In 130-200 A.D., with the creation of the Hippocratic Oath,
came the development of fetal rights, for it was the doctors who
subscribed to the Hippocratic Oath that first rejected abortion.8 3
As the Oath gained popularity among doctors, it set the stage for
the common law in England and eventually the common law in
America.84 At first in common law, it was not considered a crime
to perform or receive an abortion before the "quickening" of the
fetus - quickening being defined as the "first recognizable
movement of the fetus in utero... usually [between] the
sixteenth to eighteenth week of pregnancy.85 As time passed the
distinction between the "quickened" fetus and the "un-quickened"
fetus began to fade, resulting in the enactment of the 1828 New
York legislation that made all abortions illegal, "un-quickened"
as well as "quickened."86 "By the end of the 1950's, a large
to a book by Rachel Roth entitled "Making Women Pay: The Hidden Costs of Fetal
Rights'); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302-16 (1993) (discussing substantive due
process analysis); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (holding that
"substantive due process analysis must first begin with a careful description of the
asserted right, for the doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost
care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field."); Tamar Lewin, Drug Use
in Pregnancy: New Issues for the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at A14 (examining
how controls on addictive pregnancy present new and dangerous threat to treatment of
women under current law).
83 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132 (characterizing origins of Hippocratic Oath in 130-200
A.C.E. as "nucleus of medical ethics" and discussing beginnings of modern resistance to
suicide and abortion); see also TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 902 (18th ed.
1997); Matthew P. Previn, Assisted Suicide and Religion: Conflicting Conceptions of the
Sanctity of Human Life, 84 GEO. L. J. 589, 594 (1996) (explaining when Hippocratic Oath
was adopted by Pythagoreans it expressed their view on sanctity of life).
84 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 133-40; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2273 (1997) (describing promise physician makes when taking Hippocratic Oath to
"neither give a deadly drug to anyone if asked for it nor.. .make a suggestion to this
effect."); Jeffrey L. Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person, 9 AM.
J.L. AND MED. 1, 12 (1983) (discussing powerful ethical and moral combination of
maternal instinct and Hippocratic Oath "not to abort fetus which is capable of
independent ex-utero survival.").
85 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 133 (discussing common law roots to argument for fetal
rights); see also Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of
the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist
Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1249 (1992) (describing eighteen-week fetus as
potentially viable human being). See generally William E. Buelow III, To Be and Not to
Be: Inconsistencies in the Law Regarding the Legal Status of the Unborn Fetus, 71
TEMPLE L. REV. 963, 977 (1998) (noting difference between quickening and viability).
Compare State v. Dr. A.U. Forte, 222 N.C. 537, 539 (1943) (describing quickening as 'the
first motion of the fetus in the womb felt by the mother").
86 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 138 (discussing gradual adoption by American States of
legislation that banned and punished completed abortions as well as attempts to receive
abortion, with exception of therapeutic abortions - those abortions necessary to preserve
life of mother); see id. at 139, n. 31 (citing New York anti-abortion legislation); see also
Kelley P. Swift, Hope v. Perales: Abortion Rights under the New York State Constitution,
61 BROOK L. REV. 1473, 1512 (1995) (discussing history of New York legislation
regarding abortion rights). See generally Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The
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majority of jurisdictions banned abortion, however and whenever
performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the
mother."87 From this historical context came the present day
argument in support of a fetus' right to physical integrity.88
The argument in support of the fetus' right to physical
integrity was first presented to the Supreme Court in the 1973
case Roe v. Wade.89 The argument claimed that the fetus was a
"person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and
is therefore entitled to constitutional protections.90 The
Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows: (1) Amendment IX,
"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people;"
and (2) Amendment XIV, "[No State shall] deprive any person of
Moral and Legal Status of Fetuses and Embryos, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703, 717
(1999) (reviewing American case law and legislation pertaining to metaphorical
descriptions of status of fetus and embryo).
87 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 139 (noting exceptions to this general trend); see also Mary
Ellen Pellegrino, The Protection of Prenatal Life: Tort Claims of Wrongful Birth or
Wrongful Life and Equal Protection under Pennsylvania's Constitution, 72 TEMPLE L.
REV. 715, 716, n.10 (1999) (discussing Justice Blackmun's analysis on history of abortion).
See generally James M. Jordan III, Note, Incubating for the State: the Precarious
Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-Dead Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REV.
1103, 1116-17 (1988) (discussing national trend at time of Roe to liberalize abortion
statutes). Cf. Lenow, supra note 84, at 5 (1983) (stating that abortion was not criminal
offense at early common law).
88 See Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1000 (discussing strategy of anti-choice activists,
which is to reverse Roe and have fetuses recognized as full "persons" under law, affording
fetuses full protection under Constitution). See generally Bruce Fein and William
Bradford Reynolds, Let the State Legislatures Grapple with the Abortfon Dilemma,
MANHATTAN LAW., June 13, 1989, at 13 (noting legislative debates between pro-choice and
pro-life forces). Cf Edwin M. Yoder, Pro-Choice Marchers Forget How Court Works, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 12, 1989, at 17A (arguing function of court is not to secure
majority rights); cf also Letitia Kowalski, Looking for a Solution: Determining Fetal
Status for Prenatal DrugAbuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1255, 1285 (1998)
(explaining States have been reluctant to intrude in body of individual for sake of
another).
89 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 (discussing status of fetus is "person" under Fourteenth
Amendment of United States Constitution); see also Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp.
798, 800 (W.D. Va. 1981) (differentiating between creation of right of action for fetus and
remedy and accrual of cause of action); Julie Elizabeth Rice, Fetal Rights: Deiffing
"Person" Under 42 USC § 1983, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 347, 350 (1983) (discussing federal
cases that address issue of whether fetus may maintain action under U.S.C. § 1983). See
generay McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 751, 754 (W.D. Pa. 1972),
afl'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting that unborn child has been recognized in civil
law for recovery in certain tort actions
90 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 (arguing fetus is "person" within meaning of Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Buelow, supra note 85, at 985 (discussing case law addressing issue
whether fetus is "person" as stated in Fourteenth Amendment); 'The Fetus Lost in the
Labyrinth Ways of the Law,'N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1983, at A22 (urging that Supreme
Court's approach is example of legal formalism). See generally Ralph Schaffer,
Lawmakers Wrestle a Concept: Is a Fetus a Person?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., Feb. 18,
1990, at C3 (noting cases regarding right of fetus to protection as person).
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life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor.., deny
any person... equal protection of the laws." 91 In a careful
analysis to determine if a fetus was a "person" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Roe court discussed
specific references to the term "person" within the Constitution,
concluding that none of the references had any possible prenatal
application. 92 Even though the Court did not find the fetus to be
a "person" within the meaning of the Constitution, it did
recognize that the fetus had protectable interests beyond the
Constitution. 93 Thus, although not under the auspices of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a state may define and protect rights of
a fetus, opening the door for the imposition of criminal sanctions
against drug addicted pregnant women.94
91 U.S. CONST. amends. IX, XIV; see also John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and
the Constitutional Test, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 494 (1997) (explaining importance of Due
Process Clause in Supreme Court decisions); James W. Hilliard, To Accomplish Fairness
and Justice: Substantive Due Process, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 95, 101 (1996) (noting
history of due process rights). See generally John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rghts: A
Century of Progress, 59 U. CM1. L. REV. 13, 19 (1992) (explaining role of Bill of Rights
before and after adoption of Fourteenth Amendment).
92 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 133; see also Bartlett, supra note 21, at 894 (discussing
references to word "person" within Constitution:
The first, in defining 'citizens,' speaks of 'persons born or naturalized in the United
States'. The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal
protection Clause. 'Person' is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of
qualifications for Representatives and Senators,... , in the Apportionment Clause,... ,
in the Migration and Importation provision,... , in the Emolument Clause,... , in the
Electors provisions,... in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of
President,... , in the Extradition provisions,... , in the superseded Fugitive Slave
Clause 3, and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments);
Jill A. Pryor, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach
for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 883 (1988)
(discussing meaning of person in context of naturalized U.S. citizen). See generally
Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL
L. REv. 203, 226 (1995) (explaining legislative intent of Equal Protections Clause). Cf.
John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385,
1390 (1992) (arguing that Equal Protection Clause is inadequate vis-A-vis Civil Rights
Act).
93 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (stating "state does have an important and legitimate
interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman.... and that it
has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life."); see also Jeffrey A. Parness and Susan K Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting
the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 257, 259-61 (1982) (discussing
government interest in unborn). Cf Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 583 (1975) (recognizing
legitimate government interest in human life in non-abortion context). But see Jefferson
v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, 247 Ga. 86, 87 (1981) (granting temporary
custody of unborn viable child to Georgia Department of Family and Children Services).
94 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (concluding that in certain situations State may define
and protect rights of fetus); see also Sam S. Balisy, Maternal Substance Abuse. The Need
to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1235 (May 1987)
(asserting that criminal penalties should be imposed onto women who abuse drugs and
alcohol during pregnancy). See generally Developments in the Law - Medical Technology
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In the war called the fetal-maternal conflict, the battle over the
rights of the fetus is a battle that feminists argue women cannot
afford to lose.95 The protection of the fetus through coercive
actions against its pregnant mother does nothing but subordinate
women, depriving them of their fundamental right to privacy,
liberty and personal autonomy.96 Although there is a risk to the
fundamental rights of women, states argue that the "interest in
the preservation and protection of potential life outweighs the
pregnant mother's privacy.. .. "97
and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1564 (May 1990) [hereinafter Developments
(realizing that fetal rights advocates believe that state's interest in protecting fetus could
require woman to restrict her diet, exercise, and sexual activity and suggesting that
requirement of refraining from harmful substances could be attached before attempting to
conceive); Theresa McGovern, Mandatory HIV Testing and Treating of Child-Bearing
Women: An Unnatural, Illegal, and Unsound Approach, 28 CoLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
469, 493 (Spring 1997) (noting court did not overrule previous court decision "where
significant risk to fetus outweighs minimal risk to mother, State has compelling interest
in intervening to protect rights of fetus").
95 See Schmal, supra note 17, at 307 (arguing that "[a] fetus cannot be protected
through coercive actions against its pregnant mother because it subordinates [and)
destroys her autonomy."); see also Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of
the American Constitution, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 645, 646 (Winter 1997) (asserting that
"right to constitutional privacy... agrees with other privacy rights which allow people to
decide their own role in procreation"); The Evolution of the Right to Privacy after Roe v.
Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 368, 373 (1987) (recognizing that woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy is based upon her right to privacy, which is established under
Fourteenth Amendment); Eileen McDonagh, My Body, My Consent: Securing the
Constitutional Right to Abortion Funding, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1999) (claiming
that Supreme Court decision regarding right to have abortion was "breakthrough for
women's reproductive rights").
96 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 309 (discussing limitations on woman's freedom
caused by criminal prosecution of drug user while she is pregnant). See generally
Developments, supra note 94, at 1564 (realizing maternal rights advocates rely on Roe
when suggesting that state could use less intrusive methods for protecting fetal health,
such as public education, free nutrition, and prenatal care programs); Tony A. Kordus,
Did South Carolina Really Protect the Fetus by Imposing Criminal Sanctions on a Woman
for Ingesting Cocaine during Her Pregnancy in Wb'tner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL
393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996)?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 319, 343 (1997) (finding state is subjected to
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review when it imposes restriction upon women
concerning issues of child bearing). But see Balisy, supra note 94, at 1229 (noting that in
certain situations, imposition may be placed upon woman's right to privacy because some
state restrictions are justified).
97 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 322 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989) and stating further that coercive actions are aimed at mothers whose fetuses
are no longer viable or have been harmed by mother's substance abuse); see also
Developments, supra note 94, at 1567 (finding in situation where woman refused to
submit to surgery in which "fetus was clearly viable and that vaginal delivery threatened
lives of both mother and fetus," rights of state outweighed rights of woman); Kristen
Rachelle Lichtenberg, Gestational Substance Abuse: A Call for a Thoughtul Legislative
Response, 65 WASH. L. REV. 377, 382 (Apr. 1990) (noting in abortions, state has two
compelling interests in limiting woman's right: protecting woman's health and protecting
potential human life). See generally John B. Wefmgfn, Case Study on the Right of
Privacy, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 839, 844 (Fall 1994) (stating even though right-to-life
group asserted more children's lives could be saved by allowing statute that would permit
[Vol. 16:267
2002] PROSECUTION OF DRUG ADDICTED PREGNANT WOMEN 289
C. The Rights of The State
The states regulation of pregnant women 98 balances the
woman's right to privacy, liberty and physical autonomy against
the fetus' right to physical integrity and the states' interest in
potential human life.99 The states' interest in protecting children
dates back to 1925 in a United States Supreme Court case Pierce
v. Society of SistersOO In Pierce v. Society of SisterslOl and its
mother to decide whether to kill her child after it was born, court found that it was
certainly unconstitutional because court has to protect right of fetus).
98 See Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 42, at 1326 (discussing State's efforts to
regulate woman's conduct during pregnancy to include both direct intervention, either
through forced medical treatment or preventive detention, and indirect sanctions, such as
criminal prosecution and civil penalties) (citing In re Jamaica Hospital, 128 Misc.
2d.1006, 1007-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) in which New York court ordered blood transfusion
on woman who was eighteen weeks pregnant because of State's interest in preservation of
human life against woman's expressed wishes not to receive transfusion); see also
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (expanding constitutional
permissible scope of State regulation of reproduction); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Ct.
of Appeals 1990) (discussing District of Columbia case in which court ordered doctors to
perform cesarean section on terminally ill pregnant woman without her consent, based on
State's interest in fetus and interests of fetus itself); People v. Pamela Rae Stewart, 16
Ms. 92, 95 (San Diego Mun. Ct., Cal. Feb. 24, 1987) (charging Pamela Stewart with
criminal liability for damage to her fetus due to Pamela's disregard of her physician's
advice to discontinue use of amphetamine during her pregnancy and to abstain from
sexual intercourse); Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Felicia B., 144 Misc. 2d 169 (Fam. Ct. 1989); In
re Danielle Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976 (Fain. Ct. 1985) (discussing civil penalties imposed on
women based on their conduct during pregnancy); SovinsEk, supra note 51, at 123-24
(1997) (prosecuting Pamela Stewart for prenatal conduct that led to death of her child
was found to be invalid because statute was not intended to create criminal liability for
prenatal injury).
99 See Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 42, at 1326; see also Udo Werner, The
Convergence of Abortion Regulation in Germany and the United States: A Critique of
Glendon's Rights Talk Thesis, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 571, 578 (June 1996)
(reasoning that state could in second trimester of woman's pregnancy regulate abortion
solely to protect woman's health and that during last trimester, state could "go so far as
to proscribe abortion' to realize its interest in protecting fetal life"). But see Alicia
Ouellette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine Court-Ordered Medical
Procedures during Pregnancy, 57 ALB. L. REv. 927, 947-48 (Summer 1994) (recognizing
that Supreme Court has rules that "fetal rights are always subordinate to woman's health
and safety" and that regarding issue of forced fetal surgery, woman's right prevails
because undergoing major surgery surely compromises her physical health); Paltrow,
supra note 13, at 1010-11 (finding that even though state may prohibit abortion after
viability, it may not prevent woman of her right "to liberty, privacy, and equality through
state-sanctioned 'pregnancy police'").
100 268 U.S. 510, 516 (1925) (developing State's interest in protection of children). See
generally Jeffrey M. Croadsdell, State Constitutional Protection of Cldren with AIDS
and the Right to a Public Education, 42 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 239, 239-40 (discussing states'
interest in protection of children with AIDS); L. Steven Grasz and Patrick J. Pfaltzgraff,
Child Pornography and Child Nudity: Why and How States May Regulate the Production,
Possession, and Distribution of Nude Visual Depictions of Children, 71 TEMPLE L. REV.
809 (Fall 1998) (discussing states' interest in protecting children from child pornography
and nudity); Gregory M. Gochanour, Note, House of Judah: The Problem of Child Abuse
and Neglect in Communes and Cults, 8 U. MICH. J.L. 1089, 1097-98 (Summer, 1985)
(discussing states' interest in protection of children from abuse and neglect).
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progeny, the Court concluded that the state's interest in
safeguarding children extends against their parents.1 02 These
cases set the precedent for the states' interest in the protection of
both pregnant women and their fetuses. 03 The states' interest
developed in a 1973 United States Supreme Court case, Roe v.
Wade, 10 4 where the court held that although a woman had a right
to obtain an abortion, her right to terminate her pregnancy was
not absolute.105
Concluding in Roe that "the right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision, but that right is not unqualified and must
be considered against important [Sitate interests in regulation"
solidified the states interest in the protection of potential human
life.106 Though the states' interest in the protection of the fetus
may limit a woman's fundamental right to privacy, the Court
justified such limitations by claiming a "compelling [S]tate
101 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 516.
102 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (emphasizing State's
interest in guarding welfare of child in public places and streets "even against the wishes
of a parent."); see also Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d. 843, 853 (4th Cir.
1998); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1972) (setting out Bel/otti analysis to
determine standard of review for legislation regarding minors, which includes three
factors: (1) peculiar vulnerability of children, (2) inability of children to make critical
decisions in informed, mature manner and (3) importance of parental control in child
rearing); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
103 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. See generally John A- Robertson, Gestational
Burdens and Fetal Status: JustifyingRoe v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 189, 189-90 (1987)
(discussing protection of women's reproductive rights); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body: A Historical Perspetive on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection,
44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 280-300 (Jan., 1992) (stating in nineteenth century state justified
its protection of the fetus by arguing protection of fetus equals protection to American
citizen, and even greater, American Society).
104 See Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 133 1973); see also Siegel, supra note 103, at 277
(discussing Roe's account of history of abortion).
105 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (discussing Blackmun's decision in which court held that
'States have legitimate interests in seeing to it that abortions are performed under
circumstances that insure maximum safety to the patient [and] a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy is not absolute, and may ... be limited by the state's legitimate
interests in safeguarding the woman's health, in maintaining proper medical standards
and in protecting human life."); see also Siegel, supra note 103, at 275 (discussing Roe's
account of state regulatory interests in abortion). See generally Christina L. Misner, What
if Mary Sue Wanted an Abortion Instead? The Effect ofDavis v. Davis on Abortion Rights,
3 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & LAw 265, 274-77 (1995) (discussing woman's right to
obtain abortion).
106 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 ("[A]t some point the [Sltate interests as to protection of
health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant."); see also Misner, supra
note 105, at 274-77 (discussing restrictions Court placed on right of women to obtain
abortion in case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, creating undue burden standard for
regulations placing restrictions on abortion). See generally Siegel, supra note 103, at 348
(discussing constitutionality of states' regulation of abortion).
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interest" in the protection of potential human life.107 At some
point in time it is "reasonable and appropriate" for states to
decide that the health of a potential human life "becomes
significantly involved [and the] woman's [right to] privacy is no
longer sole ... [and] must be measured accordingly.108 At this
point, the woman's fundamental right to privacy becomes an
issue of autonomy, questioning whose rights will reign supreme,
the woman's right to personal autonomy or the fetus' right to
physical integrity and the states' interest in the protection of that
physical integrity. 109
The Roe Court did not answer this question.1 0 Although the
Court stated the "point in time" did not begin at conception, the
Court did not say when this point in time did begin."'1 Thus,
while creating the interest in the protection of the fetus, the
Court also created confusion as to when and in what form states
should exercise this protection.1 2 It was left up to the individual
jurisdictions to determine when a person's life really began in
107 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; see also Molly C. Dyke, Note, A Matter of Life and
Death: Pregnancy Clauses in L ng Will Statutes, 70 B.U. L. REV. 867, 875-77 (Nov.
1990) (questioning when states' interest becomes compelling to impinge on right to
privacy); Courtland L. Reichman, Comment, Federal Remedies for Abortion Protest:
Discordance ofFirst Principles, 44 EMORY L.J. 773, 777-81 (Spring 1995) (discussing case
law developing states interest in protection of potential human life).
108 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159; see also Dyke, supra note 107, at 875-77 (discussing
trimester framework developed in Roe case to determine when fetus becomes viable and
when state may regulate woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy); Reichman, supra
note 107, at 777 (stating that Court has qualified conclusion that "the right to abortion
must be balanced against states' interest in protecting... the unborn child"); Joan R.
Bullock, Aborion Rigrhts in America, 1994 BYU L. 63, 78-84 (1994) (discussing women's
abortion rights as opposed to rights of fetus).
109 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 300 - 08 (discussing woman's right to personal
autonomy versus fetus' right to physical integrity); see also Bullock, supra note 108, 77
(discussing women's rights); Reichman, supra note 107, at 777 (discussing case law
developments in determining at what point states interest in protecting fetus outweighs
woman's right to privacy and physical integrity).
110 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132-60. The Court never really answers the question of
when a fetus' right to physical integrity and the State's interest in the protection of that
right overrides the woman's right to personal autonomy. Id.; see also Bullock, supra note
108, at 79 (discussing point of viability of fetus).
II1 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 ("When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at
this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to
the answer [of when life begins].'); see also Bullock, supra note 108, at 79 (discussing the
point of viability of fetus).
112 See id. (reviewing various religious and philosophical beliefs articulating when
human life begins). But see Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (2000) (stating,
"[tlhe State's interest in regulating abortion pre-viability is considerably weaker than post
viability"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (holding valid Roe's
central holding, "viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal
life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions").
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order to be protected by the state.11 3
There is a large discrepancy among doctors, lawyers, scholars,
philosophers, and neighbors as to when a human life begins."14
Most people when asked the question, "When does a person's life
really begin?" would answer at fertilization or conception."15
Biologically, human life begins before fertilization, "since the egg
or oocyte is alive before sperm entry, as were innumerable
antecedent cells, back through the origin of [the] species."'116
Exactly which stage of human reproduction marks the beginning
of a human life is a matter of opinion and may vary from person
to person.11 7 It is important, however, from a legal standpoint, to
113 See generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 n.2 (Stevens, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Unremunerated Rights: Whether and How
Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 381, 400-01 (1992) (arguing if states were
free to declare fetus personhood, states could overrule constitutional rights by creating
new persons); Golden, supra note 43, at 473 (discussing number of news broadcasts from
various jurisdictions, displaying women who consume alcohol and drugs during their
pregnancies and State's attempts to regulate these women); Linden, supra note 61, at
117-20 (1995) (discussing state's changes use of criminal statutes allowing prosecution for
fetal death); Paltrow supra note 13, at 1010-11 (stating Supreme Court may allow states
to determine start of life, but Court has last say about competing rights of state and
privacy).
114 See BARRY R. FURROw ET AL., HEALTH LAW, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
891 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing difference in opinion as to when human life begins). See
generallyMcDonagh, supra note 95, at 1086 (discussing lack of consensus in disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology); Linda Farber Post, Bioethical Considerations of
Maternal-Fetal Issues, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 761 (1997) (reviewing various
characteristics necessary for personhood); Martin Rhonheimer, Fundamental Rights,
Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of Life in a Constitutional Democracy. a
Constitutionalist Approach to the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, 43 AM. J. JuRis. 135, 135-
36 (1998) (discussing problems involving legal protection of prenatal human life using
views of Supreme Court, Natural Law, and Vatican).
115 See Furrow, supra note 114, at 891 ("Flertilization continues to be the cry of many
religious bodies and indeed also of the (Alugust World Medical Association, who, in 1949,
adopted the Geneva Convention Code of Medical Ethics, which contains the clause: 'I will
maintain the utmost respect for human life from the time of conception.'"); see also Clarke
D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 469, 504 n.161
(1998) (quoting John Robertson, RESOLVING DISPUTES OVER FROZEN EMBRYOS, Hasting
Ctr. Rep., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 11 "While the preimplantation embryo is clearly human and
alive, it does not follow that it is also a human life' or 'human being' in the crucial sense
of a person with rights or interests"); Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent
Advances in Medically Conception: Legal, Ethical, & Social Issues, 17 AM. J. L. & MED.
329, 329 (1991) (discussing ethical and legal questions of when life begins).
116 See Furrow, supra note 114, at 891-93 (explaining human reproductive process
from primordial germ cells, cells that make up tissue of early embryo, to time at which
fetus can survive outside maternal body); see also Parsi, supra note 86, at 753 (making
distinction between embryos and pre-embryos and beginnings of human life). But see
Stephen C. Hicks, The Right to Life in the Law: The Embryo and Fetus, the Body and
Soul, the Family and Society, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 805, 828 (1992) (discussing
alternative question of when person receives her soul).
117 See Furrow, supra note 114, at 891; see also Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1009
(discussing concurring opinion by Justice Stevens in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in
which he writes that developing organism is not yet "person" and does not have "right to
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develop a practical consensus regarding the beginning point of a
human life because the decision directly affects the rights of the
woman and, in turn, the rights of the fetus." 8
While the Supreme Court has never formally determined when
a fetus becomes a "person" for constitutional purposes,"f9 the
Court has developed a state interest in the protection of potential
human life, opening the door for the criminal prosecution of
pregnant women on behalf of the fetus.120 Although there still
remains a discrepancy among jurisdictions as to when a human
life begins, the trend over the past fifteen years has been to
expand the common law rights of the fetus and recognize that a
fetus can be a victim for the purposes of civil and criminal
litigation.'21 For example, most states now permit an estate to
file a tort cause of action on behalf of a stillborn child, when
slightly over ten years ago a majority of states would have
life"). See generally Kellam T. Parks, Protecting the Fetus: The Criminalization of
Prenatal Drug Use, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 245, 245 (Winter 1998) (discussing
holding from supreme court of South Carolina in which court defined late-term fetus as
person under its child abuse and endangerment laws); John A. Robertson, In the
Beginning: The Legal Status ofEarly Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 437 (1990) (discussing
fierce controversy over beginnings of human life); Elizabeth Spahn & Barbara Andrade,
Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in Religion, Science and Law, 32 U.S.F. L.
REV. 261, 261 (1998) (reviewing differing views on beginnings of human life).
118 See Farrow, supra note 114, at 891. See generally David Westfall, Beyond
Abortion: The Potential Reach of Human Life Amendment, 8 AM. J. L. & MED. 97, 99
(1982) (discussing impact of one possible decision on human life). But see William R.
Caste, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV.
907, 958 (1988) (lamenting lack of consensus among Justices of U.S. Supreme Court).
119 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973)(holding term "person" as it appears in
Fourteenth Amendment is not intended to include fetus); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913-14 (1992) (reafl-ming Roe's holding that, "the unborn have
never been recognized in law as persons in whole sense"). See generally Jed Rubenfeld,
On the Legal Status of the Proposition that 'Life Begins at Conception", 43 STAN. L. REV.
599, 599 (1991) (discussing problems developing because Court never decided whether
fetus was independent person).
120 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (concluding that State has interest in protection of
potential human life); see also Reinesto v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz.
1995) (dismissing charges of child abuse brought against woman who used heroin while
pregnant); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 37 (Ga. 1992) (dismissing drug distribution
charges against pregnant woman who used cocaine while pregnant because court held
legislature did not contemplate use of statute for "distribution" to fetus).
121 See Furrow, supra note 114, at 893; see also Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543
N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996); Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995); Farley v.
Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W.Va. 1995); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1990)
(discussing uncertainty of when embryo or fetus becomes "unborn child" to be considered
victim); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199 (1985) (holding that estate of stillborn could recover
damages under wrongful death and survival statute); People v. Ford, 221 Inl. App. 3d 354
(1991); Smith v. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 203 Ill.App.3d 465 (1990);. But Cf Rademacher
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 737 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Ferguson v. District of
Columbia, 629 A.2d. 15 (D.C. 1993); Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d. 1241 (Ala.1993);
People v. Davis, 30 Cal.Rptr. 2d 50 (1994).
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required the child to be born alive before the accrual of the tort
action. 122 In addition, over the past several years, some states
have made penalties for feticide (the killing of a fetus) similar to
those penalties imposed for homicide, and several states have
created new homicide statutes to explicitly include fetuses as
those whose death may give rise to homicide prosecutions. 123
These trends in applying criminal sanctions to actions taken
against the fetus have paved the way for the criminal prosecution
of drug addicted pregnant woman.
II. THE COLLISION BETWEEN THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN, THE
RIGHTS OF THE FETUS AND THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE
In the criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women
the rights at issue, which are women's rights to privacy, liberty
and personal autonomy, the rights of a fetus to physical integrity
and the rights of the state in the protection of potential human
life, collide.124 A past illustration of a collision between these
rights is Roe.12 5 In Roe, the Court held that a state law
122 See Furrow, supra note 114, at 893; see also Valerie D. 233 Conn. 492 (1992)
(petitioning to terminate parental rights because mother injected herself with cocaine
several hours before labor); In re Jesus L. 1990 WL 279626 (Conn. 1990) Memorandum of
Decision (petitioning to terminate parental custody based on prenatal substance abuse);
Stallman v. Youngquist 125 II. 2d. 267 (1988) (bringing action to recover for prenatal
injuries sustained in automobile accident); In re Monique T. 2 Cal. App. 4th 1372 (1992)
(petitioning to remove child from mother's custody because child tested positive for
cocaine immediately after birth); In the Matter of Stefanel Tyesha C. and In the Matter of
Sebastian M. 157 A.D. 2d 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d. 1990) (petitioning for child neglect
judgments against mothers who used cocaine while pregnant); M.S.S. v. Demaio, M.D.
503 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (alleging medical malpractice for injuries cause
prenatal and neonatal by physicians); In the Matter of Gloria C. 124 Misc. 2d. 313 (N.Y.
Fain. Ct. 1984)(allowing for order of protection on behalf of unborn child).
123 See Furrow, supra note 114, at 896; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (stating
"[mlurder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, (emphasis added), with
malice aforethought."); People v. Dennis, 17 Cal. 4th 468, 499 (1998) (affirming conviction
of second degree murder for killing homicide victim's fetus); People v. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th
797, 814 (1994) (affirming "[tihe third party killing of fetus with malice aforethought is
murder under section 187, subdivision (a), as long as the state can show that the fetus has
progressed beyond the embryonic stage of seven to eight weeks.").
124 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 300-10 (discussing effects of criminal prosecution
of drug addicted pregnant women on rights of women). But see Coady, supra note 46, at
684 (stating "[i.]t is submitted that the devastating physiological effects of cocaine upon
the viable fetus qualify as child abuse."); Parks, supra note 117, at 253-58 (discussing
rights of fetus to be protected from prenatal drug use). See generally Note, Developments
in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1198-99 (1980)
(discussing idea of state as parens patriae).
125 410 U.S. at 147-64 (holding, inter alia, abortion within scope of personal liberty as
guaranteed to plaintiff by Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment, though recognizing
state has "compelling interest" in both safety of mother and welfare of fetus); see also
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criminalizing abortion violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 126 which protects a persons right to
privacy against state action,127 including a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy.128 Although the state cannot override
the right to privacy, it has a legitimate interest in protecting both
pregnant women's health and a potential human life, of which
each interest grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various
stages of the woman's pregnancy until she reaches term.1 29
Thus, creating a conflict between the rights of the pregnant
woman, her fetus and the state130-a conflict perpetuated by the
imposition of criminal sanctions against pregnant women. 131
Stenberg v. Carhart, 147 L. Ed. 2d 743, 753-54, 769 (2000) (Nebraska statute
criminalizing performance of any "partial birth abortion" not necessary to save life of
mother held to violate United States Constitution). See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (citing Roe v. Wade in concurring opinion). But see, e.g., Hill v.
Colorado, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597, 641 (2000) (citing Roe v. Wade in dissenting opinion).
126 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (reading that no State shall deprive any person of
life and liberty, and reading Fourteenth Amendment guaranty of rights within one's
"personal liberty"); Stenberg, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 753-54 (striking down partial birth abortion
law as violation of United States Constitution); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727 (citing Roe v.
Wade in concurring opinion).
127 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (discussing creation of right of privacy under
Constitution) (citing Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Bostford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (noting First Amendment roots to right of privacy);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (noting Fourth and Fifth Amendment roots to right of
privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (noting Ninth Amendment roots to right of privacy); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (noting Bill of Rights roots to right of privacy);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ( noting Fourteenth Amendment roots to
right of privacy); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
128 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 147-64 (legalizing abortion); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 195 (1976) (citing Eisenstadt); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding
statutory ban on contraception per se violates rights of single persons under Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (holding abortion
within penumbra of rights).
129 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 (discussing that although woman has right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy, "The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that
abortion, like any other medical procedure, is preformed under circumstances that insure
maximum safety for the patient [and at the same time, uphold its duty] in protecting
prenatal life."); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-46 (1992)
(upholding Roe); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
751 (1986) (affirming Roe); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 55 (1976)
(following Roe).
130 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150; see also Schroedel, supra note 76, 92 (noting Roe Court
established woman's right to privacy while simultaneously establishing that state may
have legitimate interest protecting health of woman). See generally U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV § 1 (reading no State shall deprive any person of life and liberty, and reading
Fourteenth Amendment guaranty of rights within one's "personal liberty").
131 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 313 (discussing conflict of rights created by
criminal sanctions imposed upon pregnant drug users). But see Parks, supra note 117, at
250-61 (resolving conflict of rights issues created by criminal sanctions imposed upon
pregnant drug users). See genera/ly Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1007-15 (discussing
attempts by legislatures to impose criminal sanctions upon pregnant drug users).
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The first case of criminal sanctions against a pregnant woman
arose in California in 1985, when Pamela Rae Stewart was
criminally charged, under a California child support statute, for
failing to follow her doctor's instructions while pregnant1 32
Stewart was charged after having given birth to a severely brain
damaged child who eventually died within six weeks after
birth133 The California Municipal Court dismissed the case,
holding the statute was implemented to assure financial support
for children and not to control a mother's behavior during
pregnancy.134 Even though the charge against Stewart was
dismissed, the Stewart case represents one of the first examples
where the state attempted to prosecute a mother in order to
protect potential human life.135
States provide little consistency regarding the standard of care
132 See Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1 (1997) The court held that a mother could be
deemed criminally liable for prenatal drug use. Id.; People v. Pamela Rae Stewart, 16 Ms.
92, 95 (San Diego Mun. Ct. Feb. 24, 1987). The doctor's instructions to Stewart were to
stay off her feet, refrain from sex, and go to the hospital if she started to bleed. At the
time, Stewart had two children ages three and five, and claimed it was extremely difficult
to remain in bed with two young children. She did admit to having sexual intercourse
with her husband on the morning of November 23, 1985 (the day the alleged crime took
place), although the bleeding did not begin until the evening. After which, Stewart and
her husband, called the paramedics within an hour. Stewart was arrested and charged
ten months after she gave birth. Note: Stewart's husband was never charged for
committing a crime, although he too was aware of the doctor's instructions not to engage
in sexual intercourse while his wife was pregnant. Id.; see also Stephanie L. Hairier
Ojeda, Whitner v. State: Expanding Child Abuse and Endangerment Laws to Protect
Viable Fetuses from Prenatal Substance Abuse, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 311, 311 (Winter 1996)
The author discusses the Whitner case that came before the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, marking the first time the South Carolina Court would interpret the word
'child," as found in a child abuse & endangerment statute, to include a viable fetus. Id.
133 See Stewart, 16 Ms. at 95; see also Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1007-15 (discussing
numerous approaches by legislatures to impose criminal sanctions upon pregnant
women). See generally Victoria J. Swenson and Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance
Abusers: A Problem That Won't Go Away, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 623, 631-31 (1994) (stating
that state courts have been leading force behind efforts to curb maternal substance abuse,
by imposing both criminal and civil sanctions upon substance-abusing mothers).
134 See Stewart, 16 Ms. at 93 (stating California law under which Stewart was
charged was enacted in 1925 to actually protect women and force men to financially
provide for women they impregnated); see also Paltrow, supra note 13, at 1006-07
(discussing states expansion of civil child abuse laws to include use of drugs while
pregnant); Swenson, supra note 133, at 632-42 (discussing both direct and indirect
intervention by states to curb substance-abusing mothers).
135 See Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)(discussing cause
of action in tort for injuries to child caused by mother's negligent or grossly negligent
conduct during pregnancy); see also Wisconsin v. Deborah J.Z. 596 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999) (charging pregnant woman with first-degree intentional homicide and
first-degree reckless injury to her child when her blood alcohol concentration exceeded
.3% prior to delivering child); Swenson, supra note 133, at 640-42 (discussing Stewart
case).
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a pregnant woman owes to her fetus.136 In Johnson v. State,137
Jennifer Johnson became the first woman in the United States to
be criminally convicted for giving birth to an infant affected by
maternal drug use.138 Johnson was convicted for delivery of a
controlled substance from a mother to her child after birth, but
before the umbilical cord was cut. 139 Johnson was sentenced to
one year of "community control" and fourteen years of
probation.140 Also, Johnson was required to participate in a drug
rehabilitation program; obtain a general education diploma (the
equivalent to a high school diploma); abstain from the use of
drugs and alcohol; refrain from socialization with anyone who
used drugs or alcohol; receive permission from a probation officer
before going to a bar; and participate in a "judicially approved
prenatal care program" if she became pregnant. 141 Although,
once again, the conviction was reversed, the JohAnson case
illustrates a state's interest in the protection of potential human
136 See Sexton, supra note 1, at 419. See generally Mary J. Pizzo, Prenatal Substance
Abuse: A Cal for Legislative Action in Marylana 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 329, 342 (stating
that woman intending to carry full term, assumes duty of reasonable care to fetus);
Edward Sylvester, Chenault v. Huie: Denying the Fxstence of a Legal Duty between a
Mother and her Unborn Child 33 AKRON L. REv. 107, 127 (arguing once woman is aware
she is pregnant, she should conduct herself in reasonable manner, and noting this type of
standard has been followed in several jurisdictions).
137 602 So. 2d. 1288 (Fla. 1992).
138 See id.; See generallyJones, supra note 47, at 1174-75 (arguing that criminalizing
substance abuse by pregnant women will cause more harm than good; punishing woman
will not stop her addiction and will deter her from being open with doctor); Swenson,
supra note 133, at 650-54 (discussing constitutional concerns of punishment of pregnant
drug users).
139 See Johnson, 602 So. 2d. at 1288; see also Sexton, supra note 1, at 413 (stating
"[tihe prosecution successfully persuaded the jury that Johnson "delivered" an illegal
substance to her child through her umbilical cord just seconds before the cord was cut.").
See generally McGinnis, supra note 46, at 505-508 (discussing prosecutorial trend
charging women who used drugs during pregnancy, including mention of Johnson);
Swenson, supra note 133, at 650-54 (discussing constitutional concerns with punishment
of pregnant drug users).
140 See Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1288.
141 See id.; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (positing that drug
addicts suffer disease and are proper subjects of medical treatment); State v. Ashley, 701
So. 2d 338, 342 (1997) (stating "Medical Science prescribes rehabilitation, not
imprisonment, for the offender."); Honorable Peggy Fulton Hora, et al., Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement- Revolutionizing the Criminal
Justice System's Response to DrugAbuse and Crime in America, 74 NORTE DAME L. REV.
439, 448 (Jan. 1999Xdiscussing development of Drug Treatment Courts (DTCs) "through
the introduction of drug treatment principles to addicted criminal defendants,... in
family court,... unknowingly... the concepts of therapeutic jurisprudence [and DTCs
are applied] every day in hundreds of courtrooms across America."); McGinnis, supra note
46, at 520 (noting that drug addiction has been judicially designated as astatus that
should not be criminally penalized but that has been commonly accepted as disease).
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life. 142
The Johnson case opened a Pandora's box, resulting in an
increased number of women who have been criminally charged,
although eventually not convicted, with drug use during
pregnancy. 143 For example, in a more recent case, Washoe
County, Nevada v. Cathy Encoe,144 under a child endangerment
statute,145 the State of Nevada filed a criminal complaint against
Cathy Encoe for willfully endangering a child by using marijuana
during pregnancy. 146 Although Ms. Encoe was not convicted, the
142 See Johnson, 602 So. 2d. at 1288; see also Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d
280 (Ky. 1993); State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St. 3d 514 (1992); People v. Morabito, 151 Misc. 2d
259 (City Ct. 1992); Louise M. Chan, S.O.S. from the Womb: A Call for New York
Legilation Crminaizing Drug Use during Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199, 199
(1993)(advocating use of criminal sanctions against drug addicted pregnant woman);
Parks, supra note 117, at 246-52 (discussing criminalization of prenatal drug use);
Sexton, supra note 1, at 413 ("Since July, 1989, approximately 160 women have been
charged with crimes for giving birth to drug exposed infants.").
143 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 29, 1421-36 (1991). The article discusses the effects
of the increase in the number of women criminally charged with drug use during
pregnancy on the "Black woman." Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280
(Ky. 1993). The district court's tried and convicted Connie Welch, a thirty-three year old
woman, with second degree criminal abuse, under the Kentucky criminal child abuse
statute, after Connie had given birth to a baby boy suffering from neonatal abstinence
syndrome. The court of appeals, however, dismissed the conviction, and the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the criminal abuse statute did not encompass the
abuse of a fetus. Id.; State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St. 3d 514 (1992). The State charged a mother
with one count of child endangerment for giving birth to a child addicted to cocaine. Id.;
State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490 (Wis. Ct App. 1999) The State of Wisconsin
charged a mother with attempted first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree
reckless injury whose blood alcohol concentration exceeded. 3% prior to delivering the
child. Id.; State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1991). The State charged a
woman with aggravated child abuse based upon the use of cocaine during her pregnancy).
Id.; People v. Morabito, 151 Misc. 2d 259 (N.Y. City Ct. 1992). The State charged a
pregnant woman with criminal possession of a controlled substance and endangering the
welfare of a child. Id.
144 110Nev. 1317 (1994).
145 Nits § 200.508, which reads in part:
Any person who ... willfully causes a child who is less than 18 years of age to suffer
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect or to be
placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as
the result of abuse or neglect... is guilty of a gross misdemeanor unless a more
severe penalty is prescribed by law for an act or omission which brings about abuse,
neglect or danger. Id. ;
see also MASS. ANN. LAWS, Ch. 119 § 51A (Lexis 2000Xrequiring reporting by medical
health professionals of child neglect or abuse). See generally In re Stefanel Tyesaha C.,
157 A-2d 322, 331(1990) (reversing dismissal of neglect petition charged against mother
who admitted using marihuana daily during pregnancy and whose newborn's urine tested
positive for cocaine); In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111,116 (1980) (holding that mother's
prenatal conduct can be considered probative for finding of child neglect); In re Ruiz, 27
Ohio Misc. 2d 31,35 (1986) (holding that maternal addiction that results in newborn
suffering narcotics withdrawal symptoms falls within purview of child neglect statute R.C
2151.031).
146 See NRS § 200.508.
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state's reoccurring attempts to criminally prosecute women for
drug use during pregnancy demonstrates a clear existence of a
conflict between the rights of women, the fetus and the state. 147
The criminal prosecution of pregnant women for the harm
caused to their unborn children by using drugs is a recent
phenomenon; one that raises the question what is the state's
rationale for imposing criminal sanctions against drug addicted
pregnant women. A discussion of the theories upon which the
criminal sanctions are based may offer the answer.
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
OF DRUG ADDICTED PREGNANT WOMEN
The theories upon which the criminal prosecution of drug
addicted pregnant women are based vary among jurisdictions.148
Women who give birth to children affected by maternal drug use
have been charged with crimes under statutes that punish the
distribution of drugs to a minor, child abuse and neglect, assault
with a deadly weapon, reckless injury and homicide.149 Deducing
from these types of charges, a woman is being not being
prosecuted because of her illegal drug use but because she is a
147 See NRS § 200.508; see also Schmall, supra note 17, at 286 (discussing conflict of
rights created by criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women). See generally
McGinnis, supra note 46, at 505-11; Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 42, at 1336
(observing state regulation of pregnant drug addicts is model that narrows problem to
conflict between mother's rights and child's welfare and should shift to broader construct
accepting of interdependence of maternal-fetal relationship).
148 See Sexton, supra note 1, at 419 (noting "laws in each [S~tate vary, and provide
little consistency concerning the standard of care a pregnant woman owes her fetus."); see
also Don't Punish Addicts; Treat Them, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 5, 1990, at 2B
(noting pregnant women who take drugs must receive treatment or undergo criminal
prosecution); Tammerlin Drummond, Police Adopt Child-Abuse Policy//Mothers of Drug-
Addicted Babies May Be Prosecuted, ST. PETERSBERG TIMES, Mar. 24, 1989, at 1 (noting
in Tampa Bay, cases of infant drug addiction have not been prosecuted in the past);
Marlene Sokol, Theories on Crack Babies off Base, Expert Says, ST. PETERSBERG TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1993, at 3B (noting mothers are incarcerated rather than being treated in Tampa
Bay, Fla.).
149 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1431 (stating "[cireative statutory interpretations
that once seemed little more than outlandish concoctions of conservative scholars are now
used to punish women [for drug use during pregnancy.]"); Better Ways to Aid Pregnant
Drug Addicts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 1990, at 2C (noting New Jersey
established abuse statutes with regards to unborn fetus); Joseph H. Brown, A Drug-Free
Birth Is a Baby's Entitlement TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 22, 1998, at 6 (explaining prosecutors
charge mother with variety of charges including reckless homicide and abuse); see also
Isabel Wilkerson, Jury in Illinois Refuses to Charge Mother in Drug Death of Newborn,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1989, at 10 (noting Ill. Prosecutor charged woman with involuntary
manslaughter and delivery of controlled substance to infant).
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woman who is pregnant.150 In addition, pregnant women receive
harsher sentences than drug-addicted men or women who are not
pregnant. 151 The legal rationale behind the criminal prosecution
of drug addicted pregnant women is the woman's pregnancy,
because a woman's conduct while she is pregnant could cause
harm to the fetus; the illegality is not drug use, but the
pregnancy.1 52 Under the guise of public policy considerations and
defended by the theory of formal equality, this rationale is just
another form in which the state tries to exert control over a
woman's body.153
Society is concerned with the health of the unborn child of a
drug addicted mother because eventually the child will be
brought into the world, brining with him/her tremendous
expenses, i.e., the child's medical bills and the child's expenses if
he/she becomes a ward of the state.1 54 Thus, in the name of
150 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1445 (quoting "[plrosecutors charge these
defendants not with drug use, but with child abuse or drug distribution - crimes that
relate to their pregnancy."); Better Ways to Aid Pregnant Drug Addicts, supra note 149,
at 2C (explaining New Jersey legislation charging mother with child abuse and not drug
possession or drug use); Don't Punish Addicts; Treat Them, supra note 148, at 2B (noting
consequences of not getting treatment is criminal charges of child abuse); Drummond,
supra note 148, at 1 (charges would be based on child abuse).
151 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1445 (arguing only avenue available for drug-
addicted woman who becomes pregnant to escape criminal charges is abortion); Get Ready
for the Pregnancy Poh'ce, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 20, 1989, at 2C (noting some
legal experts agee pregnant women are more likely to be sent to prison if drugs are found
no matter initial crime); Jailed Because She Is Pregnant" A Superior Court Judge Went
Beyond His Duty, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1988, at C8 (noting pregnant woman jailed
because judge wanted to protect unborn fetus from her drug use even though she was
convicted for forging checks). But see Stopping the Stones, COURIER-J. (Louisville, KYY.),
Oct 3, 1993, at 2D (noting reversal of seven-year prison sentence for prenatal abuse
because court did not want to discriminate against pregnant women).
152 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1445 (arguing criminal prosecution of drug addicted
pregnant women punishes pregnancy).
153 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 311 (discussing criminal sanctions imposed upon
pregnant women for drug use is another way in which State maintains control over
woman's body); see also Thompson to Sign Cocaine Mom Bill in Waukesha Milwaukee, J.
SENTINEL, June 11, 1998, at 4 (noting pregnant woman using alcohol or drugs may be
detained to protect the fetus). See generally Better Ways to Aid Pregnant Drug Addicts,
supra note 149, at 2C (showing New Jersey State making it illegal for pregnant mother to
use drugs); Don't Punish Addicts; Treat Them, supra note 148, at 2B (noting State either
forces upon woman treatment or face criminal punishment).
154 See Sexton, supra note 1, at 410-11 (discussing societal concerns regarding care
expenses for child born to drug addicted mother); see also Joan Beck, Pregnant Women
Can Do Terrible Harm to Their Unborn Children, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 19, 1995, at 11
(noting costs can exceed $100,000 in medical bills); Colleen K Connell, Legal
Battleground: The Womb, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996, at 26 (noting potential tragic
consequences and serious public health concerns). See generally Thompson to Sign
Cocaine Mom Bill in Waukesha, supra note 153, at 4 (noting drug use by pregnant woman
can cripple her child for life).
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public policy, under a child abuse or neglect statute, states
impose criminal sanctions against drug addicted pregnant
women.15 5 This differential treatment between women and men
is based in the theory of formal equality.156
The theory of formal equality realizes the differences in
circumstances and characteristics between women and men.
Formal equality theorists rationalize that because only women
possess the characteristics that enable them to become pregnant,
women should be treated alike and men treated differently.157
Therefore justifying the differential treatment between men and
women by claiming that although the rule of law is different for
women as opposed to men the result is equal.158 Historically,
courts have approved of legislation that treated women less
favorably then men because women were biologically different. 159
For example, in Bradwell v. illinois,160 the Court affirmed a
state's refusal to allow a woman to practice law, because "civil
law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman." 16 1  States, rationalizing the imposition of criminal
155 See generally Cahn, supra note 16, (discussing use of criminal child abuse and
neglect statutes to impose criminal sanctions upon drug addicted pregnant women);
Henry, supra note 78, at 207 (discussing California's approach to impose criminal
sanctions against drug addicted pregnant women); Better Ways to Aid Pregnant Drug
Addicts, supra note 149, at 2C (noting New Jersey Legislator passed abuse statutes to
protect the fetus); Brown, supra note 149, at 6 (indicating charges of homicide and abuse).
156 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 313 (discussing the differential treatment between
men and women).
157 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 101 (discussing theory of formal equality); see also
Schmall, supra note 17, at 313 (discussing differences in treatment between men and
women); Andrew Bolger, Equality Body Urges Law Against Sex Discrimination, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 16, 1998, at 11 (noting to achieve equal treatment, pregnant women
would have to be compared to sick man). But see Susan Gluck Mezey, Elusive Search for
Equality - Women, Public Policy, and the Federal Courts, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Mar. 29,
1992, at 8 (debating women can not ask for special favors and demand equality at same
time).
158 See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 102, 261.
159 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 311. But See United Auto Workers v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (holding that employer's "fetal protection program"
to exclude all women from jobs involving exposure to lead was violation of Title VII
gender discrimination provisions). See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
679 (1973) (holding that military servicewoman is entitled to treat her husband as
dependent for pension purposes).
160 83 U.S. 130 (1872). But see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428
(1994) (condemning Bradwell's paternalistic treatment of women.). See generally Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (noting that Bradwell holding is
based upon traditional views of women's roles and not upon hostility toward women).
161 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 311 (citing Bradwel, 83 U.S. at 141). But see U.S.
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that women can not be excluded from military
training due to their gender); Miss. State Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
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sanctions against drug addicted pregnant mothers and not
fathers, may argue that the difference in treatment is warranted
due to the biological difference between women and men.162 The
argument may be that because only women are biologically able
to carry potential human life and the state has an interest in the
protection of potential human life, only women can be punished
for self-inflicted actions during pregnancy that may harm
potential life.163 However, the state rationale is flawed, for the
criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women in no way
protects potential human life.164 In fact, the criminal prosecution
of drug addicted pregnant women increases the harm to the
fetus. 165
The imposition of criminal sanctions against pregnant mothers
may lead to a decrease in pre-natal care to the fetus.166 Criminal
sanctions may deter the pregnant woman from seeking the pre-
natal care necessary to deliver a healthy child, especially if the
(holding that stereotyping women as nurses in medical profession is inappropriate); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that state statute can not prohibit woman from acting
as estate administrator because of her gender).
162 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 313 (arguing State's rationalize differential
treatment between men and women is warranted due to biological differences). See
generally Salim Muwakkil, Don't Get Hooked on Sterilization, RALEIGH NEWS-OBSERVER,
Sept. 24, 1999 (describing program offering $200 to drug addicts to become sterilized);
Cheryl Wetzstein, States Getting Tough With Moms Addicted to Cocaine, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1998 (reporting cocaine-addicted women give birth to 124 babies each day.)
163 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 313. See generally Babies and Drugs: Pregnant
Addicts Pose Serious Risks, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Oct. 9, 2000; Terry Plumb, Waging
War on Crack Moms, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Mar. 5, 2000 (describing national trend
toward criminalization of drug addiction among mothers).
164 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 313:
[It is clear that the Court - and our society, has never given up on justifying different
treatment because of that separate spheres notion. Instead of concentrating on equal
access and avoiding unnecessary and non-critical incursions into female empowerment,
the Court continues to make decisions on the basis of its earliest ruminations about what
it, as guardian of our social fabric, considers sex-appropriate. Id.
See generally Anthony Jewell, Court Backs Mother in Fetal Alcohol Case , B. GLOBE,
May 27, 1999; Judy Peres, Setback for Fetal Rights in Wisconsin Alcohol Case, CHIC.
TRIB., May 27, 1999 (reporting case where woman was not charged with attempted
murder for drinking herself into stupor during ninth month of her pregnancy).
165 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1449 (arguing criminal prosecution of drug addicted
pregnant women actually increases harm to fetus). See generallyEileen McNamara, Fetal
Endangerment Cases On The Rise, B. GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1989.
166 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1449 (stating "[p]regnancy may be a time when
women are most motivated to seek treatment for drug addiction.., the government
should capitalize on this opportunity by encouraging drug-addicted women to seek
help... [and not punish them by the imposition of criminal sanctions]."); Lynn Paltrow,
Methadone in Pregnancy, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999 (pointing out that pregnant heroin
addicts are routinely denied methadone treatment despite evidence that withdrawal from
heroin increases risk of fetal death).
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woman may use drugs.167 Studies have shown that infants
exposed to cocaine are also subject to other risks such as the use
of additional drugs, cigarettes, alcohol and malnutrition.168 If a
woman fears visiting a physician to receive pre-natal care
because she is addicted to drugs, the threat to the health of the
unborn child is extremely heightened.169
The states argue that the differential treatment of women,
with the criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women,
is necessary to protect potential human life.' 70 When a drug-
addicted woman becomes pregnant, however, the only avenue to
escape criminal charges is to abort the fetus. 171 The state's
justification for the differential treatment is flawed, for an
167 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1447-50; Lauri Rice-Maue, Pregnant Alleged
Heroin Addict Charged With Reckless Endangering, DAILY CALL (Allentown, Pa), Aug. 6,
1999.
168 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1429-30 (discussing how studies are often clouded
by other fetal risk factors); see also Balisy, supra note 94, at 1218 (stating that effects of
cigarette smoking on fetus can result in reduced birth weight and increased risk of
respiratory distress syndrome, hypoglycemia and jaundice); Claire E. Dineen, Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome: The Legal and Social Responses to Its Impact on Native Americans, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (1994) (discussing increased risk of fetal abnormalities due to
alcohol consumption in mothers). See generally Thompson, supra note 42, at 363
(discussing risk factors that may affect pregnancy outcome).
169 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1429 (stating that addicts often receive little or no
prenatal care); see also Michaelle Oberman, Substance Use during Pregnancy: Legal and
Social Responses: Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of
Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 511 (1992) (discussing avoidable
harms suffered by fetus when mother does not obtain prenatal care); Bonnie I. Robin-
Vergeer, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return to Principled
Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745, 767 (1990) (discussing how children of female addicts
receive neither appropriate prenatal care nor adequate parenting after birth). See
generally Spencer, supra note 41, at 397-98 (discussing how health of fetus can be
improved by creating incentives for dug addicted mothers to seek out prenatal care).
170 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1449 (discussing State's argument that criminal
prosecution drug addicted pregnant women is necessary for protection of potential human
life) (discussing State's rationale of protecting fetus from harm); see also Margaret
Diamond, Echoes from Darkness: The Case of Angela C, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1061, 1066
(1990) (stating that protecting fetus as "innocent third party" from adult's decision to
refuse medical treatment is one of State's interests); Sovinski, supra note 51, at 111
(stating that Supreme Court recognizes that State interest in potential life is to be
weighed against woman's autonomy rights). See generally Michael A. Grizzi, Compelled
Antiviral Treatment of HIV Positive Pregnant Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 473, 488
(1995) (stating State's interest can override patient's refusal to be treated for several
reasons, including protection of innocent third parties).
171 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1445-46 (questioning government's justification for
criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant woman); see also Schmall, supra note 17,
at 307-08. See generally Andrew Freeman, Prenatal Substance Abuse: Texas, Texans and
Future Texans Can't Afford It 37 S. TE. L. REV. 539, 583 (1996) (discussing Texas' only
avenue for protecting fetus is to pass new criminal legislation). But see Janet W.
Steverson, Stopping Fetal Abuse with No-Pregnancy and Drug Treatment Probation
Conditions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 295, 298 (1994) (discussing possible probation option
and monitoring as potential alternative).
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abortion does not protect potential human life.172 An abortion
terminates potential human life.173 Ironically, the theory of
formal equality was created to remedy the effects of past gender
discrimination,174 and the only effect of the differential
treatment, the criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant
women, is the suppression of a woman's fundamental right to
privacy, liberty and personal autonomy.1 75 The exact opposite for
what the theory was intended.176
CONCLUSION
The criminal prosecution of drug addicted pregnant women
creates a conflict between the rights of the woman to privacy,
liberty and personal autonomy; the right of the fetus to physical
integrity; and the right of the state in the protection of potential
human life. The states argue that their interest in protecting
potential human life justifies imposing criminal sanctions
against pregnant women in order to protect fetus' right to
physical integrity. The results, however, are counter to the
state's goal relating to the protection of potential human life.
The only effect of such sanctions is the unjustifiable
subordination of a woman, denying her the fundamental right to
privacy, liberty and personal autonomy.
Such government coercion ignores the still developing
172 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1449 (arguing that pregnant women who are
addicted to drugs will more often seek abortions if they know their addiction will lead to
criminal prosecution); see a.so Spencer, supra note 41, at 396 (stating that many medical
and legal scholars consider prosecution ineffective and counter-productive). See generally
Carol Gosain, Protective Custody for Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem ofMatemal Drug
Use? Case Note on Wisconsin Ex Rel. Angela v. KIuzick, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 799, 800
(1997) (discussing how states should be cautioned from deterring women from seeking
prenatal care). But see Chan, supra note 2, at 202 (stating advocates of criminal sanctions
claim prosecution will direct women toward treatment).
173 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1449.
174 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1449 (discussing premise of equality doctrine). See
generally Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (discussing application of equal
protection); Christina DeJong and Chirstopher E. Smith, Equal Potection, Gender, and
Justice at the Dawn ofa New Century, 14 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 125 (1999) (discussing
how Equal Protection Clause provides mechanism to remedy race and gender
discrimination); John Galotto, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLuM. L. REV.
508, 509 (1993) (discussing meaning of "equality").
175 See Calm, supra note 16, at 817; Roberts, supra note 29, at 1449; Schmall, supra
note 17, at 313. But see Parks, supra note 117, at 245.
176 See Roberts, supra note 29, at 1449; Schmall, supra note 17, at 313; see also Calm,
supra note 16, at 817. See generally Bartlett, supra note 21, at 101 (discussing theory of
formal equality).
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jurisprudence of the unborn. It rejects the predominance of the
mother's interests ... it excuses fathers... [accepting]
antiquated notions of patriarchy which deny both genders and
their children an opportunity for fair treatment .... 177
177 See Schmall, supra note 17, at 333-34.

